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During the 1980's the Soviet Union underwent a decade 
of dramatic change. The study of these changes initiated 
by the Gorbachev government has focused primarily on the 
reforms initiated by the state- perestroika from above. 
However, by the mid 1980's it was apparent that the state 
was not so much reforming society as society was drastically 
altering the state. Some analysts at this time began to 
shift to examining reforms at the grassroots level-
perestroika from below. 
This thesis is an examination of these perestroika 
from below reforms. The thesis seeks to asses the 
usefulness of the civil society model in describing and 
explaining the dramatic nature of this change. Informal 
associations, a key element of a functional civil society, 
are examined to analyze the extent of their importance 
to the Gorbachev era reforms. 
The analysis of the usefulness of both the civil 
society model and its informal associations is historically 
grounded. The thesis analyzes the historic growth and 
evolution of the civil society idea from late Imperial 
Russia to the late Soviet period in 1989. The analysis 
of the Gorbachev era focuses on the changing Soviet society 
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and its contribution to the reform process. 
The thesis concludes that the civil society model, 
while having some deficiencies, overall helps to explain 
the dramatic nature of change occurring in the Soviet Union 
in the 1980's. The analysis also supports the critical 
importance of informal associations in fostering and 
assisting democratization efforts. However, the work notes 
that there are significant obstacles in the path of further 
development of civil society 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
When bad men combine, the good must associate; 
else they will fall one by one, unpitied victims 
in a contemptible battle. 
Edmund Burke 
The Gorbachev era will likely be remembered for 
its valiant effort to reform the corrupt and inept 
socialist state that the Soviet Union had become by the 
1980's. However, Gorbachev's reforms were far more than 
an attempt to save a faceless political system. They 
were a desperate attempt to pull Soviet society back into 
the political system and give socialism a "human face." 
This attempt to unify society and state in the Soviet 
Union was at the core of the reforms. The importance 
of this attempt to heal the schism between society and 
state has often been minimized by Western analysts. The 
myopia was fueled by models that viewed the Soviet 
political system as monolithic and its leaders immune 
to the influence of public opinion. The impact of this 
minimization of society's importance in the Soviet system 
was to focus research in the Gorbachev era dominantly 
on official state reforms or "perestroika from above." 
This focus, exacerbated by problems with access to data, 
led to a great underestimation of the importance of the 
development and growth of informal organizations in the 
USSR, often refered to as "perestroika from below." 
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This thesis will analyze the utility of the civil 
society model by examining its usefulness in explaining 
the societal change that occurred under Gorbachev in the 
Soviet Union. This analysis of the model will be based 
on how well it answers the following questions. First, 
to what extent does the civil society model help explain 
the nature of change that occurred in the Soviet Union 
under Gorbachev? Second, to what degree, does this model 
have indigenous roots in the Soviet experience? Third, 
what, if any, predictive validity does this model show? 
To answer these questions it will be necessary to examine 
historical fact, quantative data concerning the nature 
of informal associations, and political analysis of the 
Gorbachev era reforms. This model may be able to help 
explain, more than others, the complexities and subtleties 
of grass-roots movements in the USSR. This thesis will 
not focus on either the separatist movements in the former 
Soviet Republics in the late 1980's or on the great 
resurgence of religious organizations, in particular, 
the Orthodox Church. While both of these spheres of 
non-state activity are of great importance, current 
systematic data does not allow for their analysis. Rather, 
this research shall rely primarily on informal associations 
in the RSFSR because the most data is available concerning 
these groups. 
Most of the data used for this thesis consists of 
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secondary source material. The secondary sources consulted 
rely heavily on primary source material from Soviet 
governmental and other Russian sources. Quantitative 
data used in this paper is based on official Soviet 
governmental estimates and available sociological and 
public opinion data. This type of quantitative data was 
used because within the study of Soviet informal 
associations it has become the standard. 
The evidence examined will be cases of informal 
associations in Russia in the pre-Soviet, Soviet and 
Gorbachev periods, which displayed civic (democratic, 
participatory) attitudes and actions. The extent to which 
they displayed civic attitudes and actions will determine 
the applicability of the model to Russia. Precise 
measurement of either attitudes or the extent to which 
they were manifested in political action is not possible. 
Neither will influence be measured since it is not readily 
identifiable in any situation. The criteria used will 
therefore be whether or not the organizations attempted 
to participate in the political process in an open, 
pluralist fashion, in spite of the police state. Those 
that did will be considered to have been acting in a manner 
supportive of civic attitudes, and thus consistent with 
the components of the civil society model. If such 
activity is found to have been common among the 
organizations surveyed, we may conclude that, contrary 
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to conventional assumptions, the civil society model is 
applicable to the study of political interaction in Russia 
during these periods. 
A review of literature in the field shows the 
evolution of thought about the importance of societial 
change in Gorbachev's reforms. In the first works 
published about Gorbachev's reforms most analysis was 
focused exculsively on the top down reforms, the 
"perestroika from above." As society took on a more 
activist role top analysts attempted to develop a 
theoretical approach to understand its role. Moshe Lewin 
in his 1989 book, The Gorbachev Phenomenon, is acknowledged 
to have been the first to suggest a philosophical basis 
for the change that was occuring within society. According 
to Lewin, this basis was that Soviet society was becoming 
increasingly "civil." In adopting the civil society model 
as a way to view social change in the Soviet Union, Lewin 
was invoking a concept with a diverse and deep 
philosophical tradition, as will be examined later. 
However, in Lewin's book, this, by his own admission 
important concept, is dealt with in only a few pages. 
Missing is a detailed examination of the history of the 
concept, its importance to democratic movements in the 
late 1980's in the Soviet Union, and, most importantly, 
an analysis of the importance of the core of civil society, 
informal associations. Since Lewin's writing, the term 
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"civil society" has been increasingly applied to explain 
the scope and nature of change occurring in the Soviet 
Union. Both Geoffrey Hosking's The Awakening of the Soviet 
Union, and Hederick Smith's The New Russians, used this 
concept throughout their analyses to demonstrate the 
fundamental nature of the change that "perestroika from 
below" caused. Their research, while using the concept, 
once again does not devote much attention to the actual 
manifestations of civil society, informal associations, 
that were rapidly growing in the late 1980's. 
The literature on informal associations grew rapidly 
as the civil society model gained acceptance and actual 
informal associations swelled in number. These writings, 
such as Vladimir Brovkin's article on informal political 
associations in the journal Soviet Studies, or Nicolai 
Petro's chapter on voluntary associations contained in 
Alfred Rieber and Alvin Rubinstein's Perestroika at the 
Crossroads, dealt with the concept of civil society only 
in passing. They were primarily concerned with examining 
the manifestation of these changes, the actual 
associations, their numbers, demographic makeup, political 
views, etc. The authors did not, for the most part, analyze 
the broader concept of civil society. Also, this research 
on informal associations did not examine the roots or 
history of informal associations in the Soviet Union. 
However, their research provides important data about 
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the nature and extent of informal associations in the 
Soviet Union. 
A review of the literature about civil society and 
informal associations in the Soviet Union reveals some 
deficiencies. First, the civil society concept, while 
widely acknowledged as illuminating the nature of change 
in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev, has not been analyzed 
in great detail. Second, work on informal associations, 
a critical part of civil society, has tended to focus 
on the actual characteristics of these groups, neglecting 
to examine their deeper theoretical role as part of civil 
society. This thesis will remedy these deficiencies by 
analyzing the background of the civil society concept, 
its informal associations, and the historical development 
of informal associations in the Soviet Union. 
In order to accomplish this goal, this thesis will 
focus on the origins, growth, and importance of informal 
organizations within the Soviet Union from late Imperial 
Russia until 1990, with a particular emphasis on their 
greatest period of growth under Gorbachev. 1990 was chosen 
as the cut-off point for analysis of the importance of 
these groups for a number of reasons. First, there is 
a lack of data on informal associations past 1990. The 
August 1991 coup, and subsequent dissolution of the Soviet 
Union, quickly shifted most academic analysis into why 
the coup had occurred and the likely effects of the 
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dissolution of the Soviet state. Consequently, research 
on social movements and informal associations was minimized 
while many analysts shifted to more pressing policy 
problems. Second, most of the growth of informal 
associations happened in the late 1980's. Thus, analysis 
of this period contains the richest quality and quantity 
of data on informal associations, their growth and 
importance. Last, this 1990 cut-off date was chosen 
because the last discernible impact of the groups occurred 
then. This point is not to suggest that these groups have 
not and are not having an impact in the successor 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Rather, the impact 
of informal associations in creating a new pluralistic 
political system can not be measured because the process 
is still on-going. 
The Civil Society Model 
Civil society is not a new concept developed in recent 
political philosophy. Rather, the concept has been seen 
at least since the fourteenth century as an answer to 
how the "good life" can be achieved (Walzer, 1989, 29). 
As far back as Periclean Athens, the term was used to 
distinguish the civilized from the barbaric. It became 
a more developed concept during the Italian Renaissance 
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when Machiavelli and others tied it to the rule of law. 
After the Italian Renaissance, the term became increasingly 
intertwined with commercial society. Indeed, for many 
philosophers, from Locke to Marx, the concept of civil 
society could not exist independently of the ability to 
own private property (Howe, 1989,32). This philosophical 
development made civil society by definition anathema 
to those who wanted communism. 
The concept of civil society holds as its core the 
idea that society is distinct from government and that 
the state is but one institution within a pluralistic 
environment (Starr, 1988,35). This distinction was made 
clear by Edward Shils in his discussion of the concept 
when he wrote: 
The idea of civil society is the idea of a part of 
the state which has a life of its own, which is 
distinctly different from the state, and which is 
largely in autonomy from it. Civil society lies 
beyond the boundaries of the family and the clan 
and beyond the locality;it lies short of the state. 
(1991,3). 
The autonomy described is protected in a full fledged 
civil society by the rule of law that codifies freedom 
of speech, protection of minority rights, freedom of 
association, etc. (Starr, 1988,35). It is important to 
note that in a Communist political system any decision 
to stand outside of the officially sanctioned method of 
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participation is necessarily a political act. Thus, 
regardless of the specific focus of an informal 
association, all of their members in a Communist state 
are to a very real extent taking political action by not 
channeling their activities into official organizations 
(Tismaneanu, 1990,11). 
One obvious problem of the use of this concept is 
its applicability to the Soviet Union. A major argument 
used against applying the concept has been that it lacks 
any indigenous philosophical or historical roots in the 
Russian experience. Opponents argue that it is a "foreign" 
concept to Soviet society and thus could not possibly 
explain the motivations behind the changes it was 
experiencing. However, there are good reasons to believe 
that this concept is not as "foreign" as one might first 
think. 
Put simply, civil society under Gorbachev was not 
a foreign concept. It became the battle cry of the 
democratic opposition in the Soviet Union. The informal 
groups that existed had overall adopted the strategy and 
methodology of civil society thought. Civil society was 
seen, by opposition groups, as a political archetype 
(Tismaneanu, 1990,3,182). It was the selfselected beacon 
for the opposition out of the fog of their socialist 
system. This beacon was chosen because it had roots in 
the Russian experience. Reformers were drawn to the 
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fledgling civil society that existed in the late 19th 
century, the short lived freedom of the Zemstva (local 
self-government), and the informal associations of the 
dissent movement in 1960 and 1979. Perhaps none stated 
the cries of the reforms for civil society more eloquently 
than Vaclav Havel: 
••• the original and most important sphere of 
activity, one that pre-determines all the others, 
is simply an attempt to create and support the 
'independent life of society' as an articulated 
expression of 'living within the truth'. 
(Havel, 1985,67). 
Soviet reformers in particular have argued that the new 
diversity caused by the pluralism of informal associations 
was, " the sign of a search for a way out of the 
labyrinth.'' (Starr, 1988,36). An analysis of opposition 
groups under Gorbachev illustrates that the strongest 
rebuttal to the argument for the "foreigness" of this 
concept is that it was the vision for the grass-roots 
reformers in the Soviet Union. This thesis confronts 
the question of whether this concept, perhaps not 
realizable before the Gorbachev period, nonetheless 
illuminates many aspects of societal change during the 
Gorbachev period. The analysis will also examine the roots 
of the civil society concept in Russian society with a 
particular focus on the pre-Soviet and the pre-Gorbachev 
USSR. As Moshe Lewin expressed in his 1989 book, The 
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Gorbachev Phenomenon, applying the civil society model 
to the USSR under Gorbachev is a novel idea for a novel 
society (Lewin, 1989, 146). 
It is important to realize however, that Soviet civil 
society was destined to be different from Western civil 
society. The culture and history of the Soviet Union have 
determined the shape and nature of its civil society. 
However, to throw the concept out because of its Western 
orgins is to forget that although the structures in Soviet 
civil society might be different than those in the West 
their function will be similar (Starr, 1988,36). 
For purposes of this thesis the civil society model 
shall be used to designate a political system where 
government and society are distinct from one another. 
The autonomy of society is protected by the rule of law 
which codifies a number of critical freedoms including 
speech, protection of minority rights, and most 
importantly, freedom of association. The codified rights 
also extend into the right to own private property. 
Informal associations are a critical element of the 
independent society. These organizations allow individuals 
of like minds and concerns to come together without the 
interference of the state. These associations will differ, 
due to their varying concerns and purposes, in their amount 
of political activity. 
The status of civil society was fluid in the Soviet 
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Union in 1990. Many believed that Soviet society had 
moved into a new era and that prospects for the future 
growth of civil society were good (Lewin, 1989,147). 
However, regardless of prospects for its future growth 
in 1989, it had already become an important component 
of the political landscape in the Soviet Union. The body 
of this paper will analyze the origins, growth, and 
importance of informal associations as an expression of 
an awakening of civil society. 
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CHAPTER II 
ORIGINS AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF 
CIVIL SOCIETY AND INFORMAL ASSOCIATIONS 
IN RUSSIA 
To understand the importance of democratic reforms' 
occuring under Gorbachev, it is necessary to examine the 
historical development of civil society and informal 
associations and their interaction with the state. This 
analysis of the origins and evolution of civil society 
in the Soviet Union is justified for a number of reasons. 
First, to appreciate fully the revolutionary nature of 
the changes that occurred under Gorbachev it is necessary 
to see the contrast between this era and others. Only 
when this contrast is provided, can the reforms nature 
be truly appreciated. Second, the focus on origins is 
justified because it helps to illustrate segments of the 
past which may be "usable" for modern day reformers. 
This concept of "usable" past signifies an attempt by 
reformers to find a historical base for their action. 
Put simply, it is an attempt to solidify reforms by showing 
their historical roots. This attempt gained great momentum 
under Gorbachev and thus deserves analysis. Last, it 
is necessary to examine the origins of civil society and 
its development in the Russian/Soviet state to fully 
analyze a nagging question about the civil society model: 
are the model, and its values, "foreign" to Soviet society? 
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Only by examining the history of civil society is it 
possible to determine whether if the model is too "foreign" 
to be applicable to the Soviet experience. The analysis 
of the origins and development of civil society in the 
Soviet Union will focus on civil society in late Imperial 
Russia, its fate under Lenin, with a particular emphasis 
on the state's retreat during NEP, Stalin's totalitarianism 
and its effects, and the growth and importance of the 
dissident movement for civil soceity. 
Civil Society in Imperial Russia 
Civil society and informal associations have had 
an important and tumultuous history in Russia. This 
history is young, starting really only at the end of the 
19th century. The purpose of this section of the paper 
will be to examine the origins of the nascent civil society 
which developed at the end of the nineteenth century before 
being overwhelmed by the wars, revolutions, and economic 
hardship that beset Russia before the October Revolution. 
The analysis of origins of the forming civil society in 
Pre-Soviet Russia will focus on the state, and the changing 
nature of society in the early 1900's, including its rising 
professionalization, informal associations, urbanization, 
and the important development of local self-government 
through the zemstva. 
14 
The Nature of the Russian Autocratic 
State 
The Russian state historically has been the central 
institution in Russian society. The role of the Russian 
state was determined in part by the natural characteristics 
of the territory over which it presided. The climate, 
with its great temperature extremes, the area's limited 
agricultural potential, and the lack of warm water ports, 
created a society that struggled to survive in conditions 
of scarcity (Gleason, 1991,15). Under these conditions, 
society did not have the luxury of worrying about matters 
other than those of survival. The state assumed the role 
of provider, although sometimes an inept one, of needed 
services. 
The size of the Russian territory has also been 
pointed to as another reason for the far-reaching nature 
of the Russian autocratic state. The land mass over which 
it had to preside was so large that many of its leaders 
felt that only autocratic rule could hold the empire 
together. Catherine the Great, in her Instructions to 
the Legislative Commission, used this argument as 
justification for the absolute power of the sovereign. 
As Catherine noted: 
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The Sovereign is absolute; for there is no other 
Authority but that which centers in his single Person, 
that can act with a Vigour proportionate to the Extent 
of such a vast Dominion. 
In the view of this monarch, any other form of government 
would have ruined the empire. (Riha, 1964,253). The size 
of the empire thus provided autocratic leaders with a 
strong argument for the continuation of the dominance 
of the power of the state. 
These physical characteristics, along with others, 
led the Russian state in the late 1800's to encompass 
most areas of life. The state was the main provider of 
employment for individuals, it provided, although not 
always efficiently, needed services, and was the protector 
of the nation. Where the state did not or could not 
provide services, a vacuum existed, since any local, 
regional, or any decentralized autonomous initatives were 
disallowed. In comparison to others, the Russian state 
in the 18th and 19th century played a larger role than 
its counterpart in any other society (Black, 1964,480). 
This predominant role was entrenched and protected by 
the autocratic czars who showed great hostility to those 
things that existed outside of the direct control of the 
state. This hostility was fostered by a suspicion that 
elements existing outside of the sphere of the state would 
threaten its power (Monas, 1991,31 ). This suspicion led 
to the state attempting to regulate heavily the public 
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sphere. For example, beginning in 1782, for informal 
associations to exist legally, Imperial approval had to 
be obtained. This combination of government hostility 
and a society which was apathetic led to a stagnant public 
life (Bradley, 1991, 135). However, this, as weil as 
the nature of Russian society, was to change by the early 
Twentieth Century 
The Changing Nature of Russian 
Society in the early Twentieth Century 
Russia in the late Nineteenth Century experienced 
a tremendous explosion of economic growth due largely 
to the Imperial government's investment in an extensive 
railroad system, foreign investment in heavy industry, 
and the growth of agricultural production. During the 
1890's, the rate of economic growth in Russia was surpassed 
only by Japan, the United States, and Sweden. Along with 
this economic boom, Russia was experiencing rapid 
urbanization. Within the last 50 years of the empire, 
the urban population grew from around seven million to 
over twenty million (Black, 1964, 488-489). These 
conditions helped to change the nature of society and 
the role of the state in Russia. 
Between 1890 and 1917, Russian society grew and 
changed dramatically in a variety of ways. Of particular 
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importance to this analysis is the growth of merchants 
and entrepreneurs. The merchant class, which had previously 
dwindled, grew as newcomers, ranging from nobility to 
trading peasants, joined. A small, but important, new 
class of entrepreneurs developed. This group, and their 
support of the arts, was important in sparking the cultural 
growth referred to by Russian social historians as the 
Silver Age. The great advancement of Russian culture 
during this short period of time spanned the arts, 
medicine, science, mathematics, and engineering (Monas, 
1991, 32,35). This cultural flowering was also accompanied 
by new ideas in society about its role in the state. 
Russian society began to see itself as different 
and separate from the state. The Russian term used to 
describe this idea is obshchestvennost, which came to 
be understood as describing society's realization that 
the Russian nation and state were separate entities. 
However, this realization was never embodied in a class, 
but rather existed as a largely informal understanding 
about the nature of society (Kassow, West, & Clowes, 1991, 
4). This view of the society as separate and distinct 
from the state was a prerequisite for the forming of any 
type of civil society in Russia. With this new conception 
of society, individuals began to act outside of the sphere 
of state control by forming and joining informal 
associations. The growth of these organizations was rapid 
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and unprecedented. By 1912, the Moscow City Directory 
listed over 600 different associations with interests 
ranging from sports to education. The directory is an 
appropriate source to use for evidence about informal 
associations in 1912 for two reasons: (1) The directory 
is one of the only governmental documents that provides 
quantitative data on informal associations in 1912. (2) 
The number of informal associations listed in the 
directory, 600, has been generally accepted by social 
historians as an adequate representation of these 
independent groups in Moscow. A growing work force and 
urbanization, described earlier, led to a division of 
labor that can be documented due to the formation of 
informal associations for specific vocations (Bradley, 
1991, 136-137). Society, as well as overall culture, 
truly experienced a renaissance during this period. Why 
did this occur? 
A number of conditions joined together to create 
the unique environment which allowed the Russian Silver 
Age to occur. These conditions were political, 
social-economic, and cultural in nature. Politically, 
the state had legitimized the operation of nongovernmental 
associations through the Great Reforms which allowed the 
zemstvo, which will be described in detail later, to act 
autonomously in the public sphere. Also, power during 
this time was decentralized from the autocrat to 
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ministries. For example, although approval from authorities 
was still necessary for informal associations to be legal 
it devolved to a number of ministries (Bradley, 
1991,139-140). The state had surrendered its monopoly 
on power, allowing society to come alive in the vacuum. 
Society was ready to come alive due to the social 
changes it had experienced during the late Nineteenth 
Century, most importantly the increased level of economic 
growth and increased urbanization. The wealth generated 
during this period, along with the tremendous explosion 
of city growth, led to rising expectations that municipal 
governments simply could not meet. Since the state was 
not able to meet the new demands, public associations, 
legitimized already by the de-monopolization of power 
by the state, stepped in (Bradley, 1991, 140). 
Culturally, the great explosion of informal 
association was influenced by an increased interest in 
the national culture of Russia. This interest in 
indigenous culture led to a new examination of folk culture 
and art. A number of specific informal associations grew 
to meet this need, such as the Society of Natural Science, 
Anthropology and Ethnography and the Moscow Archaeological 
Society (Bradley, 1991, 141 ). 
The zemstvo, rural self government, is an important 
break in the monopoly on power the state had wielded and 
deserves special examination. These self-governing bodies 
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were created as part of the Great Reforms of the 1860's 
by the Zemstvo statute of 1864. This statute created 
the zemstvo, primary organ of self-government, at the 
district and provincial level throughout Russia and 
empowered it to manage, "local economic and welfare needs" 
(Timberlake, 1991 ,165-166). These self-governing rural 
bodies were created by the state with the hope of forming 
a bureaucratic apparatus that would make easier the 
provision for the defense and welfare of the Russian people 
(Porter, 1992,2). To meet their obligations, these bodies 
were given the power to act independently with some state 
oversight in their areas of competence, which were many 
and varied (Pushkarev, 1988,52). 
Due to the endemic suspicion of the state about things 
that operated outside of its direct control, individual 
zemstva were prohibited by law from coordinating their 
activities. During periods of crisis, such as the 
Russo-Turkish war, famines, or epidemic outbreaks, the 
law, because of necessity, was bent to allow regional 
congresses to convene. Moves to revise the law, to allow 
inter-zemstvo contacts, were met with hostility from the 
government. The Minister of Internal Affairs Viacheslav 
Plehve in 1904 thought these demands treasonous as they 
aspired to weaken the power of the monarch. However, 
after a direct appeal to Nicholas II by zemstvo leaders 
they were allowed to form a nationwide informal 
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philanthropic organization. But the law was not reformed 
and thus contributions of manpower and material to this 
organization still had to come from autonomous zemstva 
(Porter, 1992, 45) 
The zemstvo is of importance to society in late 
Imperial Russia. The devolution of power to rural self 
government from the state was the first major break with 
the monopoly on power the state historically had. The 
zemstva grew at a tremendous pace both horizontally and 
vertically. The organizations grew from 392 in 1911 at 
the district and province level to over 483 by 1917 
(Timberlake, 1991, 166). By 1912, this organization that 
was created to manage local economic and welfare needs 
was responsible for programs that included in the rural 
areas: public education, medicine and sanitation, building 
and road maintenance, agricultural programs, veterinary 
medicine, and philanthropic projects, to name but a few 
(Pushkarev, 1988,58). 
The importance of the zemstvo is not confined to 
its important programs. These organizations also helped 
to change the nature of Russian society. The zemstva 
acted as the first transmission belt of urban ideals, 
such as the developing middle class identity, to the rural 
areas. The development of zemestva also created new 
conceptions of service. Increasingly, service in these 
organizations was seen as qualitatively different from 
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service to the state. This new conception of service 
led many individuals to join zemstva out of a sense of 
social obligation instead of the state. This competition 
between the two organizations, along with the massive 
employment of specialists by zemstva, some 70,000 by 1910, 
led to an upsurge in the education and development of 
specialists (Timberlake, 1991, 164-165). Last, and 
importantly, the zemstva took significant political action. 
In 1879, two independent zemstva, in Tver and Chernigov, 
petitioned the sovereign to allow popular representation 
throughout the empire. During the revolution of 1905, 
it was a group of zemstvo leaders who made up the majority 
of the historic Constitutional Democratic Party, or Kadets 
(Pushkarev, 1988,53+55). Quite simply, the leaders who 
forced democratic change from the czar in 1905 were former 
zemstvo members. 
Russia in the early 1900's was very alive. Society 
was attempting to define its existence outside of the 
state, as the concept of obshchestvennost illustrates. 
Informal associations, long looked at with suspicion by 
the state, were allowed to flourish and grow. This Silver 
Age however, was short lived, crushed by unnecessary wars, 
revolutions, and economic hardship. However, an important 
question is whether this society, before its destruction, 
had become truly civil. This question is important because 
reformers under Gorbachev were preoccupied with answering 
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it in their search for a historical basis for democratic 
iniatative in the Soviet Union. 
Did Civil Society Exist in Late Imperial Russia? 
An examination of society and state in Russia during 
the early Twentieth Century shows that they underwent 
far reaching and fundamental change. However, was this 
change enough to constitute a civil society? In other 
words, did classes exist that advocated different demands, 
had a respect for the rule of law, operated outside of 
the control of the state, and wanted further democratic 
reform of the Russian state? The answer to this question 
can largely be found by examining the status and nature 
of the "middle class" in Imperial Russia. This class 
illustrates the problems endemic to all classes within 
the Russian state. Also, this class, because of its 
sensibilities and ability to solve problems of economic 
productivity, has been identified as a prerequisite for 
the development of any civil society (Monas, 1991,29). 
In Imperial Russia, it is difficult to define any 
"middle class" for a number of reasons. First, it is 
difficult to define what a "middle class" would be in 
the Russian experience. Historically, there has been 
no middle class in Russia. Rather, there have been groups 
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which some have termed "middling." Second, it is difficult 
to define middle classes generally because of what has 
been called the paradox of middle class formation. 
According to Stuart Blumin, who analyzed the formation 
of the middle class in the United States, the difficulty 
is centered around the nature of the middle class which 
due to its focus on individuality is highly fragmented 
(Kassow, West, & Clowes, 1991, 3,4-5). With these 
difficulties in mind, and the lack of easily accessible 
social statistics about class in late Imperial Russia, 
the question must be reformulated. Although it would be 
difficult to define the exact nature of a middle class 
in Russia, it is possible to examine whether there was 
a middle class identity held by members of society. 
If the primary criterion used to gauge the existence 
of a middle class is based on political action then it 
can be definitively answered that one did not exist. 
But, if the criterion used is not action, but society's 
attitudes about individual initative, the role of the 
state and the rule of law, another answer arises (Kassow, 
1991, 367). Russian society, in the early 1900's, came 
to see itself in a fundamentally new way. Through concepts 
such as obshchestvennost, society was creating a truly 
public sphere independent of the state. Critical in the 
formation of new attitudes about the state and individual 
initiative were informal associations. These associations 
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served in late Imperial Russia to act as transmission 
belts introducing to segments of Russian society what 
are traditionally thought of as middle class sensibilities. 
Along with this, informal associations were creating an 
atmosphere conducive to the increased professionalization 
of the work force, another element necessary for the 
creation of a middle class. In the late days of Imperial 
Russia, these middling elements created a grouping that, 
while fragmented, was aspiring to democratic liberties 
(Bradley, 1991, 146-7). 
However, these common attitudes never led to the 
formation of a middle class in Russia due to the middling 
elements' lack of cohesion. Quite simply, there was never 
any coordinated action by these groups (Kassow, 1991,367). 
Attempts to unify the middle around a common ideology 
also failed. For example, the call for the creation of 
a new bourgiese middle class advocated by an informal 
entrepreneurial association called the Riabushinsky circle, 
fell on hostile or deaf ears in society (West, 
1991,148-150). The groups which existed in the middle 
of society in late Imperial Russia embraced an ideology 
that was based on individualism producing a "class" that 
was as fragmented as it was unified. Many factors led 
to this fragmentation such as institutional, gender, and 
occupational rivalries, competing regional economic 
interests, and ethnic conflicts (Wagner, 1991, 150 & Owen, 
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1991,80-81). 
An examination of the impact of societal change in 
the early Twentieth Century in Russia results in some 
interesting and important conclusions. First, although 
society was going through a period of great change, an 
articulate middle class never emerged. However, through 
the growth of informal associations, and other social 
changes such as increased urbanization and division of 
labor in the work force, middle class attitudes did 
develop. These attitudes, held by fragmented middling 
groups, were democratic and supported the idea of civil 
society. Even without a middle class, Russia did develop 
a type of embryonic civil society through the growth of 
"civilizing" informal associations that blossomed during 
the cultural renaissance of the Russian Silver Age. 
Unfortunately, the two wars, revolutions, and economic 
chaos of late Imperial Russia never allowed the middling 
groups to develop into a true class. In the final analysis 
this period may best be remembered as containing important 
ideas and structures that were never given a chance to 
develop fully. This period does suggest the potential 
for an alternative democratic path for Russian society. 
It is this idea of an alternative path of development, 
indigenously developed in Imperial Russia, that makes 
this period part of what one social historian has called, 
"a usable past" for modern day reformers. 
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Civil Society under the Bolsheviks 
and NEP 
Society as it had existed in the last days of Imperial 
Russia was quickly overwhelmed by the revolutionary change 
that occurred around it. In the tumultuous times of the 
First World War, February and October Revolutions, and 
the early "War Communism" of the Bolshevik regime, society 
underwent a complex and largely destructive metamorphosis. 
This section of the paper will briefly examine the nature 
of the Bolshevik revolution and its impacts under Lenin 
on society. In particular, the era of the New Economic 
Policy will be examined to see if it provides another 
segment of "usable past" for reformers moving in the 
direction of civil society. 
One of the main guiding forces behind the Bolshevik 
seizure of power was Marxism. The analysis of Marxism 
for my purposes will be focused on the relationship of 
Marxism to civil society issues. This ideology served 
as the rationale for the revolution's primary leader, 
Lenin. Due to the importance of Marxism to Lenin and 
the other Bolsheviks, its nature seems to deserve further 
examination. Marx believed, as did Lenin, that the way 
to end the alienation of mankind was through revolution 
which would end class struggle (and class divisions) by 
elevating the embodiment of labor, the proletariat, over 
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the bourgeoisie. In order to reach the new epoch in human 
development, communism, private property would have to 
be abolished. In order to achieve the goals of communism, 
Marx took a utilitarian view of individuals, regarding 
them as means to obtain revolutionary ends (Ozinga, 
1991,33). When communism was finally reached, the state 
would be unnecessary and simply wither away. Marxism 
was seen by Lenin as a plan for the wholesale change of 
society (Brzezinski, 1989,7). 
Marx, importantly, was hostile to the concept of 
civil society. This hostility is based on Marx's analysis 
that civil society evolved directly out of the "production 
and commerce" of the bourgeoisie. According to Marx, 
the primary principle of civil society was egoism, which 
alienated individual men from mankind. Marx saw civil 
society as a model of the past that was in diametric 
opposition to socialism. As Marx wrote in his "Theses 
on Feuerbach", published in 1888, "The standpoint of the 
old materialism is "civil" society; the standpoint of 
the new is human society, or socialized humanity." (Tucker, 
1978, 163,50,145). Consequently, due to Marx's views, 
civil society was something to be overcome, not a model 
to emulate. 
Before leaving this brief discussion of Marxist 
ideology as it relates to civil society, it is necessary 
to examine one of Lenin's major contributions to Marxism, 
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the dictatorship of the proletariat. The dictatorship 
of the proletariat, while mentioned in the writings of 
Marx and Engels as a transition period between capitalism 
and communism, remained before the Bolshevik revolution 
largely an abstraction (Ozinga, 1991,59). Lenin, however, 
took this abstraction and made it the heart of Communist 
power in Soviet Russia. Some political theorists have 
gone so far as to see this as being "the linchpin of 
Leninism" (Tucker, 1986,165). Lenin saw the dictatorship 
of the proletariat as being the leadership of the 
proletariat by the "vanguard," a small elite group that 
had Marxist consciousness and would lead the working men 
of the proletariat to revolution (Hazard, 1964 1 74). In 
order to obtain this goal, the dictatorship would socialize 
the means of production, destroy capitalism, and ultimately 
abolish old coercive institutions (Ozinga, 1991,59). 
The leadership of the proletariat by a band of dedicated 
Marxist revolutionaries was necessary because in Lenin's 
views, the proletariat masses on their own were, 
"slumbering, apathetic, hidebound, inert, and dormant" 
(Lipset, 1981,115). 
Lenin's view of the masses, coupled with the important 
role he placed on leadership of them by the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, molded his views on society. Lenin 
saw all organizations, regardless of their avowed purpose, 
as a type of transmission belt to transfer revolutionary 
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consciousness from the elite to the masses. Also, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, which has strong 
paternalistic overtones, reflects and strengthens this 
belief (Von Laue, 1971,169-170). This dictatorial 
paternalism led Lenin to want state guidance in all 
relationships, even those between individuals (Hazard, 
1964, 137). 
This brief examination of Marxism/Leninism should 
reveal the ideologies' hostility to civil society. 
Marxists want to abolish private property which, as 
discussed in Chapter One, is often seen as the essence 
of civil society. Marxists' antipathy towards civil 
society goes even further however, since they see it as 
part of the bourgeois past that must be swept away by 
revolution. Lenin's "dictatorship of the proletariat" 
is also hostile to the idea of civil society in its 
overwhelming concern for state guidance in all avenues 
of life. The "dictatorship" would not allow for informal 
associations because the masses, not having revolutionary 
consciousness, would mislead each other. Also, Lenin, 
as a dedicated Marxist would not want to embrace this 
vestige of the bourgeois mode of production and commerce. 
Overall, the Bolshevik ideology was extremely hostile 
to society as it was developing in Russia in the early 
Twentieth Century. 
The October Revolution, and the following civil war, 
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greatly changed the face of Russia. The examination of 
these events that follows is not meant to be exhaustive, 
but rather only to illustrate the overall effect of the 
revolution on the embryonic civil society that existed 
in late Imperial Russia. In order to accomplish this goal, 
it will be necessary to examine the revolution's effect 
on democratic ideals, the civil war's effect on society, 
and the Bolshevik policy of War Communism. 
The October Revolution, as is widely known, occurred 
without much violence. However, this fact should not 
obscure the dramatic nature of change which was about 
to occur. After the Bolsheviks had concentrated power 
in their hands they drove through a number of important 
economic changes. One of the most important was the 
nationalization of industry. This policy was carried 
out on a case by case basis at a rather slow pace, so 
slow, that by June 1918 only five hundred large enterprises 
had been nationalized (Kort, 1985,110). However, although 
the scope remained limited initially, the ultimate goal 
was the elimination of private property. 
The liberal and democratic principles of society 
in Imperial Russia, already weakened by World War One, 
were overwhelmed by the revolution and the determination 
of the Bolsheviks. Once the October Revolution had 
occurred, it was assumed within society that a multiparty 
socialist government would rule. The Bolsheviks however 
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were not to allow this government to come to fruition. 
The Bolsheviks, with Lenin at their helm, took power and 
undertook actions to establish the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. In November, the Bolsheviks outlawed the 
nonsocialist press, followed by the establishment of 
revolutionary tribunals to dispense justice, and the arrest 
of leading members of other political parties, in 
particular the Kadets (Kort, 1985,103-104). It was during 
these early days of Bolshevik power that the Cheka, or 
Secret Police, was created. This organization, anointed 
by Lenin as "directly exercising the dictatorship of the 
proletariat," was used against enemies of the state (Lukes, 
1985,110). In order to fulfill its mission the Cheka, 
was able to operate outside the law (Arendt, 1968,421-2). 
Many analysts point to its creation as being of fundamental 
importance because it placed the state above the law 
(Medvedev, 1978,5). 
The final blow to democratic ideals came on January 
19, 1918 when the long promised Constituent Assembly (a 
popularly representative body) was dispersed by force. 
Lenin himself summed up the importance of this event best: 
it was, "complete and frank liquidation of the idea of 
democracy by the idea of dictatorship." (Kort, 1985,111 ). 
As the fledgling Bolshevik government matured, force and 
terror through the use of the Cheka became the standard. 
The fragile and abstract rule of law that had existed 
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before the revolution quickly lost out to the brutal and 
extreme practice of the Bolsheviks (Medvedev, 1978,5). 
The consolidation of power and suspension of 
democratic rights by the Bolsheviks largely sowed the 
seeds for the civil war which was to erupt in 1918. This 
civil war between the anti-Bolshevik forces (Whites) and 
the Bolsheviks (Reds) was brutal. Neither side was able 
to gain a quick victory and the war dragged on for three 
bloody years. The conditions were so bad in Russia that 
the time has been likened by historians to the apocalypse, 
with famine, cold, terror and disease running rampant 
over the land. Under these crisis conditions, the 
Bolshevik government began to rely even more heavily on 
terror and force. The Cheka which had been used sparingly 
before was unleashed on the population as a whole. By 
1921, only three years after the creation of the Cheka, 
the new secret police had killed far more individuals 
than the former Tsarist secret police, not previously 
known for their restraint, had in a century (Kort, 
1985,115,118-119). 
The fragile society which had existed before World 
War I, the revolution, and subsequent civil war, was 
destroyed. At least two million men were killed during 
the Russian involvement in World War One from 1914 to 
1917, 3.5 million more perished under the Bolsheviks, 
with the famine of 1921-22 adding tens of thousands more 
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to the death toll. The economic power that Russia had 
wielded evaporated, with its gross national income falling 
more than sixty percent between 1913 and 1921. These 
economic hardships were accompanied by dramatic decreases 
in the productivity of Russian industry. For example, 
in 1924, only eleven tractors were produced nationwide. 
Last, and critically, the professionals that had existed 
before the revolution were absent from the social fabric 
that could be drawn on to rebuild society (Rosenberg, 
1991,4-6). Moshe Lewin noted that the civil war had, 
"wiped out many of the advanced social, cultural, and 
economic sectors of Tsarist Russia." (1989,16) 
One of the most important aspects of the civil war 
was the creation of "War Communism" by the Bolsheviks. 
This term was used to designate the economic policy of 
the government during the civil war from 1918-1920 and 
was based on the prohibition of private trade, the forced 
requisitioning of grain from rural areas, and the 
centralization of economic activity (Medvedev, 1978,229). 
This centralization of economic activity began on June 
28, 1918 when the Bolsheviks nationalized all Russian 
industry, effectively ending the notion of private 
property. War Communism also involved the conscription 
of large segments of the population into compulsory labor 
for the state (Kort, 1985, 120-121 ). As has already been 
mentioned, force was used increasingly during this period 
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to accomplish goals, most notably the requisitioning of 
grain (Medvedev, 1978,153). This model was the operating 
economic plan for the Bolsheviks until it was abolished 
amidst great controversy and under crisis conditions at 
the Tenth Party Congress in 1921 (Kort, 1985,124). 
The analysis in this section should illustrate the 
events that were responsible for destroying Russian societ~ 
from 1914 to 1921. The fragile society that had existed 
before the devastation of World War One, the October 
Revolution and Russian Civil War, was overwhelmed by 
successive crises. Economically, the Russian people also 
suffered greatly, with their production plummeting during 
this time. Private property, the hallmark of civil 
society, was eliminated. The Bolshevik state, in part 
due to threats to its power, began to command and not 
simply lead society. These commands from 1918 to 1921 
increasingly were enforced with violence. Under these 
circumstances, society could not develop. Civil society 
and informal associations increasingly became figments 
of the past as people strove simply to survive. 
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Even with their victory in the civil war, Bolshevik 
power was still not on firm moorings. After their victory 
the policy of War Communism was still raising discontent 
among the rural areas and a majority of Soviet society. 
At the beginning of the Tenth Party Congress, a former 
military stronghold for the Bolsheviks, Kronstadt naval 
base, revolted against the government. The rebellion 
was put down after yet another brutal battle but a clear 
signal had been sent to the Bolshevik government. War 
Communism had not solved the problems that beset society 
and without significant change the state faced more civil 
conflict. It was at this Tenth Party Congress that the 
provisions of the New Economic Policy (NEP) were adopted 
as a "tactical retreat" from the forced and massive march 
the Bolsheviks had taken towards a socialized economy 
(Kort, 1985,179). The NEP allowed for private property 
and industry, at controlled levels, to come back into 
the economy. The state during this period decreased its 
use of force drastically, leading to the suspension from 
1921-1929 of terror as a primary political tool (Cohen, 
1985,7-6). As state domination of societal interactions 
subsided, society became more self-expressive and witnessed 
something of a cultural rebirth (Van Laue, 1971,161 ). 
This period of the NEP has been scrutinized as a possible 
alternative existing in Leninist socialism to the 
totalitarianism of Stalin (Cohen, 1985,7). However, a 
37 
closer examination of the NEP period is necessary to 
evaluate its usefulness as part of the "usable past" for 
civil society. 
The NEP period can best be thought of as a 
transitional period. New research has revealed that it 
was during this transition that the Soviet nation was 
built (Rosenberg, 1991,317). In other words, it was during 
1921-1928 that Soviet society began to take the form that 
we know today. There are a number of reasons for this. 
First, after the devastation of the First World War, the 
two 1917 revolutions, the civil war, and War Communism, 
society was largely "declassed." Society had been so 
severely hit by the crisis that stretched from 1917 to 
1921 that the idea of social classes had become meaningless 
because no distinguishable ones existed. The NEP period, 
due to Bolshevik power, led to an increased importance 
being put on both the social and political importance 
of social class. Even during the relatively free period 
of the NEP, it was still more socially and politically 
advantageous to be a member of the prolerariat than of 
the frowned on bourgeoisie. Consequently, during the 
early 1920's, although classes still had slippery 
divisions, they began to acquire some true form 
(Fitzpatrick, 1991, 11,13,25,28-29). Second, private 
trade greatly expanded during this time. In particular, 
the small trader, who had been eliminated during war 
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communism by the prohibition on private trade, now 
flourished. So important was private trade under NEP 
that by 1922 governmental figures estimated it to account 
for eighty percent of all retail sales occurring in the 
Soviet Union. Even the socialist government was 
increasingly dependent on the private traders to get their 
products to society. A 1927 study done by the Supreme 
Council on the National Economy estimated that fifty 
percent of consumer goods produced by the state was 
reaching individuals through private trade. It was this 
growing importance of capitalist trade that led the 
government in the fiscal year 1926/27 largely for political 
and ideological reasons reasons once again to crack down 
on private trade. This new crackdown that grew in 1928 
did not so much eliminate private trade as it forced it 
underground, consequently laying the foundations for the 
later black market in the Soviet Union (Ball, 1921, 
90,94,96,98-99). However, while private trade was allowed 
to flourish, it helped to rebuild the economic base for 
the Soviet state. Third, due to the relative 
permissiveness of the government under NEP, culture 
experienced a limited rebirth. The cultural flowering 
that occurred under NEP from 1921-1929 has been likened 
by a top analyst to a "Moscow Spring" for society (Cohen, 
1985,75). A perceptive analyst explained a possible 
rationale for why this period seems so bright when he 
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wrote, 
Perhaps culture during the NEP years appears to shine 
so brightly because of the stark contrast with the 
pitch darkness that followed under Stalin (Kort, 
1985,136). 
Even with the permissiveness of the state under NEP, 
things were still far from being free or democratic. 
In the summer of 1921, in the early days of NEP, the first 
extensive political purges took place in the Soviet Union. 
It was also at this time that Lenin called for "model 
trials" (show trials) of political dissidents to show 
enemies of the state what the punishment would be for 
their treasonous activity. The impact of the political 
purges and model trials was to swell the number of 
prisoners, supported dramatically by the fact that 
concentration camps in Russia tripled in number from 
1921-1923 (Kort, 1985,141-142,144). Also, critically 
for democracy in the Soviet Union, it was at the Tenth 
Party Congress, the same party congress at which NEP was 
adopted that the infamous ban on factionalism (Lukes, 
1985,110). This prohibition outlawed the creation of 
differing factions within the Communist Party and applied 
strict compliance and unanimous support for decisions 
taken by the majority. This limited examination of 
political conditions under NEP should serve to highlight 
the fact that the period was neither "free" nor 
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"democratic" as thought of in the West. 
It is difficult to assess the usefulness of this 
period for civil society due to the conflicting currents 
which occurred during the NEP period. For example, class 
structure was rebuilt, with a small but important 
entrepreneurial component, private property came back 
into existence, and there was some cultural freedom. 
However, political dissent against the regime was not 
allowed. Governmental control of societal interactions 
still occurred. However, the NEP period is important 
in that it was the nation building period of the Soviet 
state. Although the Soviet state was largely 
authoritarian, it had not reached the destructive 
totalitarianism of Stalin. The possibility still existed 
under NEP for Soviet society to develop in different 
directions. But, with the death of Lenin, and Stalin's 
destruction of NEP, this was not to be. 
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The Effects of Stalinism on Informal 
Associations 
Josef Stalin seized power in the Soviet Union shortly 
after the death of Lenin. Stalin eliminated the policies 
of the NEP and quickly sought to create a totalitarian 
state. The economic freedom which had existed under NEP 
was replaced by the state dominated economy as enunciated 
in the first five year economic plan by the state. The 
use of terror and force, both of which had been relaxed 
during NEP, swelled under Stalin to proportions unseen 
before in Soviet history. Increasingly, the state began 
to intrude into all aspects of life. The purpose of this 
section of the paper is to examine the totalitarianism 
of Stalin and its effect on the formation of civil society. 
This examination is necessary for a number of reasons. 
First, the Soviet Union under Stalin (1929-1953) was 
transformed into a totalitarian state. The totalitarian 
system was in diametric opposition to the values championed 
by civil society. In a totalitarian state there is little, 
if any, room for society to act independently. Second, 
Soviet society during this period underwent profound 
changes that have had lasting effects on both its nature 
and its characteristics. These changes altered society 
and subsequently affected its attitudes towards informal 
associations and civil society. 
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Totalitarianism is a system of government in which 
the state is of paramount importance. Society in this 
system does not exist to be served by government, but 
rather, to serve it. One of the more precise definitions 
of totalitarianism was provided by Stanislav Andreski: 
Totalitarianism is the extension of permanent 
governmental control over the totality of social 
life ••• Totalitarianism in this sense is, of course, 
an ideal type to which concrete cases can only 
approximate, since no government can control 
every instance of social interaction (1967,31). 
This definition highlights an important fact, that the 
totalitarian model is an ideal type. In other words, 
it is impossible for a government ever to control all 
aspects of social life. Thus, the term refers more 
precisely to the goal of governments attempting to dominate 
all aspects of social life (Buchheim, 1968,38). 
Stalin made the Soviet Union into a totalitarian 
system by a number of different measures. After Lenin's 
death, a collegial leadership of the Soviet Union was 
to rule. This leadership group was to be composed of 
Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin (Ulam, 1989,236). However, 
before this group could come to power, Stalin was able 
to consolidate his own power and take control of the state 
(Bracher, 1981,13). Regardless of whether the collegial 
group would have ever truly ruled, its removal was 
necessary for Stalin to construct the totalitarian state. 
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This action was necessary because totalitarian systems 
are recognized for their "personal leader" who commands 
the state with his ideological insight. Thus, for Stalin 
to build his system, he first had to gain personal and 
sole control of the state. 
One of the pre-conditions for the existence of a 
totalitarian state is a society of atomized/isolated 
individuals (Arendt, 1958,323). Soviet society, during 
NEP, was in a transitory stage as has already been 
discussed. Society was not isolated, but neither was 
it yet unified. Stalin, however, took grand steps to 
ensure that Soviet society would never under his leadership 
unify. In order to force the atomization of society, 
Stalin undertook a variety of different measures. These 
measures were aimed at destroying any "class identity" 
that could exist outside of the state and threaten its 
monopoly on power. The first target for Stalin's attacks 
were the Soviets. This organization, the central element 
of national representation in 1929, still played an active 
role that prevented the complete domination of the state 
by the Communist party. Stalin undermined the Soviets 
by introducing Bolshevik cells which alone had the power 
to appoint higher functionaries to central committee 
positions. This requirement, and its success, eliminated 
by 1930 any non-Bolshevik power in the Soviet state 
(Arendt, 1958,320). 
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After consolidating his power in the Soviet state, 
Stalin turned his attack to society, in particular property 
owning peasants, also known as "kulaks." The attack 
against the peasant class, which had been potentially 
one of the most powerful before the purges, was more 
severe than for any other class. Millions were killed 
in the effort to "de-Kulak" the Soviet Union. The 
remaining peasants were forced into collective farms, 
a form of agricultural servitude to the state. The impact 
of this push for collectivization and purge of kulaks 
was to convince many individuals that their lives depended 
not on what group they belonged to, but rather, on the 
whims of the state (Arendt,1958,320). Stalin succeeded 
through the mass slaughter of innocent peasants in reducing 
this potentially powerful group to an amalgamation of 
isolated and suspicious individuals. 
Even the proletariat during this time was not immune 
from attack. The introduction of the Stakhanovite work 
brigades in the early 1930's fractured unity among the 
working class in two ways. First, the system broke up 
worker solidarity through intense competition to obtain 
ever increasing production goals. Second, the 
Stakhanovites were socially distinguished from other 
workers. Any resentment in the work place was focused 
on these special workers and not on management. The effect 
of the Stakhanovite system was to displace resentment 
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to specific workers and not the state. As a last note, 
even the bureaucracy of the state was not immune from 
attack by Stalin. From 1936 to 1938, almost every 
administrative office in the Soviet state was ideologically 
cleansed. The results of this cleansing were a replacement 
of around half of all administrative personnel and the 
death of more than 8 million party members (Arendt, 
1958,322). 
This examination of the purges that occurred under 
Stalin is not meant to be exhaustive. Rather, this 
analysis has served to highlight the methods that Stalin 
used to create the atomized/isolated society the 
totalitarian state demanded. The purges further isolated 
society by the method of determining guilt which was used. 
Guilt during this time was not dependent on evidence, 
but rather on "objective guilt." In other words, 
regardless of one's actions, one still might harbor 
capitalist thoughts in one's mind and thus be guilty of 
treason against the state. Social ties were further 
fragmented during this time by the use of "guilt by 
association." This type of "guilt" meant that as soon 
as one person was arrested all of his associates were 
also suspect. In order for the associates to prove that 
they were not guilty also, they were often coerced into 
turning against their former friends to save their own 
lives. The effect of this "guilt by association" was 
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to make members of society extremely cautious and 
suspicious about forming any ties with one another. It 
is this method of guilt, so perfected by Stalin, that 
was one of the most powerful forces in creating the 
atmosphere of suspicion that permeated Stalin's state 
(Arendt,1958,323). 
Soviet society under Stalin underwent a great process 
of social change. Within the first decade of his 
leadership, Stalin was able to transform society through 
draconian measures from a mostly backwards rural entity 
into an increasingly industrial, urban, and literate 
populace. This transformation was accomplished through 
the collectivization of agriculture and heavy 
industrialization (Cohen, 1985,94,56). The first five 
year plan attempted to integrate all aspects and resources 
of the Soviet state to accomplish its goals. 
Industrialization was of pre-eminent importance to Stalin; 
some eighty percent of all investments in the first plan 
were designed to obtain this goal. As industrialization 
proceeded, the numbers of workers rose dramatically, from 
eleven million in 1928 to thirty eight million by 1933 
(D'Encausse, 1981,21-22). Soviet society during this 
period, due to increased employment opportunities in the 
cities and rural flight caused by collectivization, became 
increasingly urban. Within a decade, some 27 million 
Soviets moved from rural areas to the cities (Lewin, 
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1985,22). The great industrialization of the Soviet Union 
was not without its costs. As has already been discussed, 
the human toll was great, an estimated 10 million died 
at Stalin's hand. The economic toll on society was also 
great, from 1929 to 1932 the Soviet standard of living 
fell almost forty percent, bringing the economy to the 
same crisis levels it had been at before the end of War 
Communism (D'Encausse,1981,23). Collectivization had 
severely wounded agricultural production; output levels 
had fallen to lows reminiscent of the tsarist period 
(Lewin, 1989,101). Society, not the state, endured the 
hardships of the transformation into a modern entity. 
The impact of Stalinism on informal associations 
and on Soviet society is far reaching and important. 
The totalitarian system that Stalin developed destroyed 
the basis for informal associations in the Soviet Union 
from 1929-1953. The state was so completely involved 
in social life that freedom of association was severely 
limited (Buchheim, 1968,15). The totalitarian system 
was in opposition to any type of group existing outside 
of its direct control. To ensure that no classes could 
develop which could articulate demands on the state, Stalin 
constantly purged society. Consequently, the memberships 
of groups was constantly changing as members were simply 
liquidated. It was these purges, and their "guilt by 
association" methods, that in large part fragmented Soviet 
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society. This fragmentation was accompanied by furious 
collectivization and industrialization that increased 
the havoc in the Soviet system. Moshe Lewin has 
characterized society during this time, due to its state 
of flux and anomie, as a "quicksand society." (Lewin, 
1989,22) This "quicksand" did not provide any solid 
foundation on which to build civil society or informal 
associations. 
Soviet society also experienced great social changes 
during the leadership of Stalin. Economically, society 
was rushed into industrialization and the collectivization 
of agriculture. Industrialization and collectivization 
did transform the Soviet Union into a modern nation but 
at a horrific, and likely unnecessary, high cost. With 
millions dead from Stalin's leadership and World War II, 
society was largely depopulated. The remaining population 
was no longer predominantly rural, but increasingly urban. 
The economy lay in ruin from the disastrous policies of 
Stalin and the war. Society, while advanced from earlier 
stages, was not prepared to challenge the power of Stalin's 
state. 
Overall, during this period Soviet society experienced 
a number of lasting changes that would affect the formation 
of attitudes towards civil society. First, society became 
increasingly modern and urban. The urbanization of Soviet 
society is important, as will be discussed in the next 
49 
chapter in detail, because it fosters attitudes of 
individuality. Second, society was scared by Stalin's 
totalitarianism. One of the manifestations of this scaring 
was an endemic suspicion towards forming groups outside 
of state control. Individuals were afraid to act outside 
of the state for fear of punishment. "Guilt by association" 
tactics led to a society that was distrustful of it 
members. Although this condition was not permanent, it 
was a definite obstacle to the unification of various 
individuals and groups in society. Last, the totalitarian 
system established by Stalin did not disappear with his 
demise. Rather, attempts to move away from totalitarianism 
and towards. democracy had to be accomplished by dismantling 
the system he had built. 
50 
The Rise and Importance to Civil Society of the 
Dissident Movement 
After the death of Stalin, society began slowly to 
rebuild itself. This rebuilding occurred in an atmosphere 
of relative freedom under Khrushchev's leadership. In 
the intellectual sphere, society was allowed far greater 
freedom than it had been given during Stalin's days. 
This freedom was in part spawned by Khrushchev's secret 
speech to the Twentieth Communist Party Congress where 
the crimes of Stalin were first officially recognized. 
The questioning of the actions of the state in the past 
by Khrushchev motivated others in society to re-examine 
and criticize the past also. However, there were limits 
to what was permissible to discuss as members of society 
who pushed too far soon discovered. The intellectual 
freedom of Khruschev's leadership quickly disappeared 
during the invasion of Hungary in 1956. The "thaw" that 
had begun was quickly refrozen by harsh measures 
(Rubenstein, 1985,4-5,10). The importance of the thaw 
was best summed up by the American poet and historian 
Peter Viereck who wrote of the period: "An intellectual 
revolt, a revolt of the heart? Yes. Political freedom? 
Hardly." (Brumberg, 1970,5) The intellectual revolt was 
important, however, because for the first time since 
Stalin's days segments of society had begun to think and 
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speak openly about their ideas. 
The thoughts of society were quickly turned into 
action under the Brezhnev regime when the dissident 
movement was born. The catalytic event causing the 
formation of the first dissent group was the "show trial" 
of the two authors Sinyavsky and Daniel (Kowalewski, 
1980,7). A segment of the intellectual community protested 
the trial of the two authors as a sham and decried the 
new attempt by the regime to limit intellectual freedom. 
The regime's response to the protest was to arrest anyone 
who had associated with the protesters and the protesters 
themselves (Fireside,1980,39). However, an important 
step had been taken. No longer was society willing to 
murmur its discontent in private. Rather, the intellectual 
community was prepared to struggle for a legal movement 
that would operate in the full and open view of the 
authorities. This trial was the spark that ignited the 
minds and passions of what was to become the dissident 
movement (Medvedev, 1984,97). This section of the thesis 
will examine the dissident movement's characteristics, 
response by the Soviet government, and importance to civil 
society and informal associations. 
Members of the dissident movement in the Soviet Union 
were drawn primarily from the intelligentsia of society 
(Kowalewski, 1980,18). The intelligentsia is composed 
of professionals in all fields who are active in society 
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and are widely acknowledged as cultural, intellectual, 
and moral leaders. In his statistical analysis of the 
dissent movement from 1965-1978, David Kowalewski noted 
a trend in the dissent movement towards a slightly 
increased intellectualization of its members (1980,18). 
The dissidents were involved in dissent groups because 
they held a moral commitment to improving the system they 
lived in. This commitment was often lifelong since the 
label of dissident was not easily removed once given by 
the government. In other words, in the state's eyes, "once 
a dissident, always a dissident." (Fireside, 1980,34+43). 
David Kowalewski's analysis of statistical trends 
in the human rights protest movement from 1965 to 1978 
allows an interesting portrait of dissent in the Soviet 
Union to be drawn. Most of the members of the dissident 
movement that engaged in active protest were under thirty 
years of age. The individuals were primarily from the 
intelligentsia, as has already been mentioned. Most 
demonstrations by groups, during this time, involved 
between 50 and 150 people. The frequency of protest 
fluctuated depending on a number of variables, 
repression/thaws, but was centered in urban areas and 
averaged around 42 demonstrations a year 
(1980,19-20,18,15). This urbanization of protest was 
to be expected since demonstrations in the cities would 
draw greater attention, both world wide and nationally, 
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than those in the rural areas. 
The types of groups which fall under the category 
of dissident groups are varied. They include religious, 
national, professional, social, political, cultural, and 
humanitarian groups. All of these groups share in common 
their operation outside of state control. The motivation 
behind the creation of most of these groups had been to 
address and attempt to cure injustices in Soviet society 
(Reddaway, 1983,15). A content analysis of their self 
published literature, called samizdat in Russian, reveals 
a focus on the arbitrariness of state rule, police 
repression, and calls for an increase in the rule of law 
(Bromberg, 1970,10). Importantly, dissidents were 
attempting to change the system from within, not attempting 
to create a new system. This distinction is important 
because it distinguishes their movement from being 
revolutionary in nature (Fireside, 1980,40). 
Dissent groups were unified by their deep respect 
for human rights and freedom. The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights passed by the United Nations in 1948 became 
one of the most important documents for the dissent 
movement. In 1975, the Soviet Union, by signing the Final 
Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation, legally 
obligated itself to honor this declaration. Specific 
human rights watchdog groups, known as Helsinki Groups, 
were formed by the intelligentsia around the Soviet Union 
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to monitor regime compliance with the treaty. The treaty 
·had a twofold importance to the dissidents. First, the 
document unified groups around a core set of values and 
beliefs. Second, it justified dissidents' right to act 
independently of the state without harassment. Thus, 
it served as an important tool for legitimizing the 
.existence of various groups (Kowalewski, 1980,57). 
The intelligentsia composition of the dissident 
movement fostered a lack of support for the movement from 
workers in Soviet society. This lack of support occurred 
in part because of anti-individualist, and 
anti-intelligentsia beliefs among workers (Fireside, 
1980,39). The anti-intelligentsia bias was based on 
hostility directed towards the class due to its privileges 
(Rubenstein, 1985,322). On top of the negative beliefs 
of workers towards the intelligentsia, support for dissent 
was limited further by strong police regulation of 
dissident groups and political propaganda directed against 
them (Reddaway, 1983,14). The composition of the dissident 
movement was also of some benefit. The most important 
effect of the composition of the movement was that the 
high status of individuals involved made it difficult 
to suppress. The state at times was hesitant to crackdown 
on dissent because it needed the active support of the 
intelligentsia, as a class, for its own plans to succeed. 
Lastly, the schism between the workers and dissidents 
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may have been largely artificial. Roy Medvedev noted 
that the heart of the dissidents' message had strong appeal 
not only throughout the intelligentsia, but also with 
blue collar workers. However, the state attempted to 
limit the meeting of the two audiences, intelligentsia 
dissidents and workers, for fear of the power of the two 
groups combined (Medvedev, 1984,98,100). The regime thus 
had a vested interest in attempting to emphasize, and 
if possible widen the gap between the two classes. 
As the dissident movement aged it grew more unified. 
Evidence of the increased cohesion of the movement could 
be seen in increased verbal and financial support between 
groups, and individual joint membership in a number of 
groups. Three reasons have been pointed to for the 
increased unity of Soviet dissident groups: (1) All groups 
were unified around a core set of beliefs embodied in 
the United Nations Declaration on Universal Human Rights; 
(2) All dissident groups shared a commmon enemy, the state; 
and (3) A subculture of dissent was built in gulags among 
political prisoners (Kowalewski, 1980,24+26). However, 
even this unity among dissidents was not enough ultimately 
to defend these groups from the power of the state. 
The state's reaction to the dissident movement, after 
the trial of Daniel/Sinyavsky and arrest of dissidents 
who had protested at the trial, consisted primarily of 
ignoring the dissent movement. The state rejected or 
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ignored most of the specific demands that groups advocated. 
The rationale behind not engaging in a dialogue with the 
groups was to deny them legitimacy. In the eyes of the 
state, since these groups worked outside of official 
guidelines, they could not possibly be "legitimate" 
spokesmen for Soviet society (Reddaway, 1983,23). However, 
this passive toleration of dissent did not last for long. 
The Soviet state suppressed dissidents in an almost 
cyclical manner. The worst years for suppression of 
dissent were 1972, 1976, and the breaking of the dissent 
movement in 1979. The cycle of action and reaction between 
the state and the dissident movement was summed up by 
Alan Brumberg who wrote: 
For it is the regime that is unwilling to "draw the 
appropriate conclusions": that discontent breeds 
restictiveness; that restrictiveness creates "alarm"; 
and that alarm leads to reprisals-and thus to more 
restrictiveness, defiance, and dissent-a story as 
old as Russia itself (1970,13). 
The analysis that follows will be focused on the patterns 
of regime reaction to dissent that occurred under 
Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov/Chernenko. This analysis 
will serve to highlight the tone of acceptance/rejection 
of dissent that occurred under each leader. 
As has already been mentioned, the intellectual birth 
of the dissident movement occurred during the "thaw" in 
state control during Khrushchev's rule. This "thaw" 
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was not long lived, and was followed up by repressive 
measures taken against dissidents after the Soviet invasion 
of Hungary. However, Khrushchev had a crucial role in 
creating conditions that would be conducive to active 
dissent under Brezhenev. The most important action that 
Khrushchev took in this regard was his speech to the 
Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 regarding the crimes 
of Stalin. Although this speech did not detail, or admit, 
most of the crimes Stalin committed against the Soviet 
people, it did signal an attempt by the state to distance 
itself from the totalitarian policies of the past. The 
re-examination of the past that Khrushchev began set lose 
political, social, cultural, and judicial forces·that 
he could not control (Rothberg, 1972,5-6). These forces 
sought to ensure that the power of the state would never 
again reach the levels of control that it did during 
Stalin's day. The groups were also important in 
establishing the boundaries of what was safe to critically 
examine under Khrushchev. 
Khrushchev also affected the dissident movement by 
his reform of Soviet criminal law. Under Khrushchev's 
leadership, the Soviet legal system was substantially 
modified. Critical changes included a decrease in the 
use of the death penalty, decreases in the maximum sentence 
permissible for many crimes, and reductions in the 
authority and power of the KGB. One of the most important 
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changes was the creation of a new legal rule that stated 
that only a court could find individuals guilty of crimes, 
or subject them to punishment • Previous to this new 
law, Soviet citizens could be found guilty of crimes and 
punished without ever having a trial in a court of justice 
(Rubenstein, 1985,23). The effect of these changes was 
to encourage the intellectual community to become even 
more independent of the state. Khrushchev's tenure as 
leader of the Soviet state can best be remembered as being 
a period of relative permissiveness. It was during the 
reforms of Khrushchev that society again began to find 
its voice. This vocalization of demands was to turn to 
action under the Brezhnev regime and greater repression 
by the state. 
The Brezhnev regime realized that it was necessary 
for the Soviet state to revitalize society, but believed 
this could be done without fundamentally altering the 
nature of the relationship between state and society. 
Important in Brezhnev's plans to reinvigorate society 
was keeping the "anti-offical" ideas of the dissent 
movement from infecting Soviet society (Breslauer, 
1982,176). He believed that the campaign against dissent 
should be vigorously waged. In his own words, defending 
society from the dissidents was a "sacred duty." 
(Parchomenko, 1986,170) 
Brezhnev did not rely on the overwhelming terror 
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and repression that Stalin had used so effectively. 
Rather, he relied on selective intimidation of key 
dissident groups and individuals. The rationale for this 
selective intimidation was that the arrests of key sections 
of the dissident movement would frighten others into 
inaction (Fireside, 1980,36+39). The greatest periods 
of selective intimidation occurred in 1972, 1976, and 
1979 under Brezhnev; but, during two peaks of repression 
by the Soviet state, in 1972 and 1976, the regime retreated 
in its coercive tactics against dissidents in the face 
of international humanitarian pressure. Up until 1979 
all of the actions taken by the government against the 
dissident movement had been relatively limited. However, 
this policy was to change with the wave of crackdowns 
that occurred in 1979. In 1979, the Soviet Union invaded 
Afghanistan and world attention was shifted away from 
human rights in the Soviet Union. Incidentialy, it was 
during this year that the Soviet Union decided to 
effectively eliminate dissident groups. The new coercion 
by the state resulted in a doubling of the arrest rates 
of dissidents, increases in the length of their sentences, 
and an increasing reliance on the use of physical violence 
against them. This new wave of attacks on dissident 
movements effectively eliminated organized dissent. By 
1980, all of the former dissident groups operating above 
ground were destroyed, had gone underground, or were simply 
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silent. The success of the regime's policy was so great 
that by 1983 only one dissident group operated above ground 
in the Soviet Union (Reddaway, 1983,1013). Even the 
Helsinki monitoring groups, which had survived earlier 
suppression by the state were overwhelmed by the 1979 
crackdown (Medvedev, 1984,98). The independent voice 
of society had been once again gagged by the state. 
Brezhnev and his policies of selective intimidation had 
prevailed over society and had succeed in creating an 
atmosphere of repression reminiscent of Stalin (Brumberg, 
1970,13). 
The Andropov (1982-84) and Chernenko (1984-85) regimes 
were thus in a position of only having to keep dissident 
groups from reappearing. The back of the movement had 
already been broken by the policies of Brezhnev. Andropov, 
in particular, was not content to rest on the laurels 
of the past, and moved to harass dissident groups in new 
ways. The KGB began to broaden its policy of repression 
by arresting not only individuals involved in the dissident 
movement, but also, those who read its literature 
(Rubenstein, 1985,329). A long awaited amnesty for 
prisoners of the Soviet state was expected to occur in 
1983 during the Soviet Union's sixth anniversary. This 
amnesty many expected would release dissidents and give 
the dissent movement a new surge. However, Andropov did 
not extend amnesty to any political prisoner, not even 
61 
those with relatively small sentences, or to religious 
dissidents. Instead, the Soviet state kept amnesty from 
this group as it did for skyjackers and murderers. The 
message being sent by Andropov was clear: dissent was 
not acceptable and would not be tolerated (Medvedev, 
1984,101 ). This pattern of nonacceptance of dissent was 
continued under Chernenko. Under his leadership, human 
rights abuse in the Soviet Union continued to worsen 
(Rubenstein, 1985,3236-7). 
One of the effects of the increased repression by 
the state started under Brezhenev and extending into 
Andropov and Chernenko's regimes, was to strengthen the 
power and status of the KGB (secret police). A number 
of candiate members of the Politburo who had worked for 
the KGB were elevated to the status of full member under 
Andropov. The composition of the Politburo under Andropov 
had more representation of the secret police than ever 
before in the history of the Soviet state. This new status 
for the KGB further served to entrench the state's 
hostility to dissent and hardened its repressive 
tendencies. Chernenko was to continue on this course 
of increasing the status of the KGB by giving, for the 
first time since the death of Stalin, the title of Marshal 
to a chairman of the KGB (Rubenstein, 1985,330). 
The Soviet state has consistently, under various 
leaders, been hostile to the dissent movement. This 
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hostility was based on the operation of these groups 
outside of direct state control. The coercion and 
harassment by the Soviet state, launched with a vigor 
in 1979, was enough to decimate most dissident groups. 
However, it did not completely destroy these groups but 
rather drove many of them deep underground. These groups 
continued to operate because their concerns were based 
on true problems in Soviet society. The state suppressed 
the dissidents but the problems they addressed went 
unsolved and consequently new groups and individuals 
continued the battle. Even with the crackdown on dissent 
and subsequent damage to the movement dissident groups 
still assisted the growth of civil society in the Soviet 
Union, as will be examined next. 
The dissent movement and the various informal groups 
of which it was composed were a response by the 
intelligentsia to the forced social atomism that occurred 
under Stalin. The groups attempted to halt the social 
atomism that had occurred by rebuilding social ties outside 
of the reach of the state. To protect these new social 
ties the dissident movement asserted two fundamental 
rights: freedom of association and freedom of expression 
(Reddaway, 1983,1+5). The dissidents personally defined 
limits around their lives so portions of them could be 
kept from the state's control. In this self-definition, 
society was trying to establish for itself yet another 
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fundamental right, the right to be left alone (Fireside, 
1980,32-33). 
Apart from specific rights being demanded by the 
dissident movement, dissent in and of itself, was an 
elementary freedom. Hannah Arendt, the well known analyst 
of totalitarian systems, explained the underlying 
importance of dissent when she wrote: 
The point is simply and singly whether I can say 
and print what I wish, or whether I cannot; whether 
my neighbors spy on me or don't. Freedom always 
implies freedom of dissent. (Fireside, 1980,33) 
The underlying demand of the dissent movement was freedom. 
By demanding freedom in various forms, the movement was 
able, for a short time, to voice its concerns and insight 
into problems facing the Soviet nation. This voice, 
although muzzled quickly by the Soviet state, was able 
to break the monopoly that the state had exercised on 
ideas about the future of the peoples of Soviet Union 
(Medvedev, 1984,98). By acting outside of the state, 
and constructing various solutions to problems facing 
the nation, the dissident movement was beginning to sow 
the seeds for future political opposition (Reddaway, 
1983,15). These seeds were to bloom into real political 
opposition under Gorbachev as will be examined in the 
next chapter of this paper. 
The founders of interest group analysis of Communist 
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political systems have noted another important role of 
dissent. The dissent movement, by advocating various 
demands and attempting to pressure the state to accommodate 
them, was engaging in activities that approximate the 
role played by interest groups in democratic societies. 
Almost all dissident groups in the Soviet Union were formed 
for the "defense of specific or more general interests." 
However, these "interests" were not allowed to voice their 
demands to the state without fear of harassment or 
imprisonment. The impact of this repression by the state 
on these "interests" was to push the dissidents out of 
the system and thus transform what was originally 
intra-structural dissent into extra-structural criticism. 
This extra-structural dissent, caused in large part because 
of the response of the regime, served further to undermine 
the state's power (Skilling,1983,23-24). 
The ideas advanced by the dissent movement are also 
important to the future growth of civil society and 
informal associations in the Soviet Union. Andrei Sakharov 
served in large part as the moral beacon of the dissent 
movement from the mid 1970's until his death. Sakharov 
was overwhelmingly concerned with bettering the conditions 
for society. However, unlike many dissidents who took 
only negative action-that is pointing out problems, 
Sakharov took positive steps to suggest remedies. For 
example, in his famous Memorandum sent to Brezhnev, 
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Sakharov suggested that democratization and liberalization 
were urgently necessary in society to save the nation 
from falling economically further behind the Industrial 
world (1990,643). The tone of this message and its 
justification sound remarkably like those used later by 
Gorbachev to launch his economic policy of perestroika. 
Sakharov also advocated the use of "glasnost", public 
disclosure, as a tool to reveal the fundamental nature 
of the problems that beset the nation (1990,362). This 
term, and its effect on openness were critical in allowing 
the growth of informal associations under Gorbachev. 
However, at the most basic level Sakharov simply was a 
decent individual. This decency and its respect for each 
individual was perhaps the greatest ideal of Sakharov's 
and of the dissent movement as a whole. This concept 
was most eloquently explained by Sakharov himself when 
in response to why he, a non-Jew, was concerned about 
Jewish emigration said, "I am not supporting them as Jews, 
but simply as fellow human beings.''(1990,135) 
The dissent movement critically influenced the 
formation of attitudes towards civil society and informal 
associations. The dissidents were attempting to gain 
control back over their own lives and importantly over 
their associations. These actions were pre-conditions 
for the existence of any type of civil society. By 
removing part of their life from the state's control, 
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dissidents were carving out an area for informal 
associations to exist in. Indeed, the various groups 
in the dissent movement were informal associations. These 
associations are important because they were the first 
sign of a truly independent society since the days of 
Stalin. Although suppressed in the end by the state, 
these groups showed society that it was possible to 
challenge the power of the state. The importance of their 
success in showing society what was possible should not 
be underestimated. The groups also are important because 
they show how society could articulate its interests to 
the state. The few successes of the groups to change 
policy should not overshadow their importance as a new 
mechanism society had for communicating with the regime. 
In the end, these groups were not destroyed, but rather, 
during the "winter" of repression by the state, driven 
into hibernation. The ideas they inspired did not simply 
fade away. Instead, they were a fertile bed for new 
democratization efforts. 
The democratic nature and practices of the dissident 
movement once again show an indigenous alternative in 
society to the authoritarian state. The movement presented 
society with another path to follow, that of democratic 
civil society. The dissidents, without explicitly 
mentioning the term, were calling for civil society. 
Their demands for a space for society outside of state 
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control, for the right to associate freely, to be able 
to articulate specific interests, and to be protected 
by the rule of law are all the pillars of any functional 
civil society. Although these demands were largely not 
granted, their desire for these rights makes the dissent 




SOVIET SOCIETY UNDER GORBACHEV 
The Soviet state by the 1980's was in a sharp decline 
fostered by governmental stagnation that occurred during 
the Brezhnev era. Many Western analysts also believed 
that Soviet society was in a state of malaise. However, 
while Soviet society was apathetic about political matters, 
it would be a mistake to conclude that the society was 
stagnant. To mistake official stagnation for societal 
stagnation would be not fully to appreciate the fact that 
Soviet society by the mid-1980's was already moving in 
the direction of becoming a distinct and separate entity 
from the state. The most obvious measure of the society's 
quickening pulse was the surging second economy or black 
market that took hold in the late 1970's and early 1980's. 
In response to the lack of wanted goods and services from 
the Soviet state, entrepreneurial citizens filled the 
gap. The power of this "twilight economy" should not be 
underestimated since data showed it to account for about 
one-seventh of all non-agricultural production in the 
Soviet Union. Also, society was active in a number of 
other areas. For example, Soviet adolescents forced their 
way into the global youth culture, much to the dismay 
of state offficials. Samizdat publications, self-published 
writings, always a component of non-governmentally 
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controlled communications, rose dramatically as society 
began to define itself in the late 1970's-early 1980's. 
Pockets within Soviet society, when Gorbachev ascended 
to power, were not passive, but rather, very active outside 
of the state (Starr, 1988,27,26).). 
Society was not directing its energies in ways the 
regime would have liked. Rather than helping to build 
the socialist state, society was attempting to escape 
from it. The growing disenchantment with the Soviet state 
was caused by many factors, not the least of which was 
the stagnation of the regime itself (Lapidus, 1991, 137). 
Increasingly, in the 1980's, society wanted out of the 
social contract into which the Soviet state had forced 
it. The disillusionment and apathy toward politics reached 
to the highest levels of society. The lack of real 
political participation for even party members had become 
so great that even they were becoming apolitical. It 
was this pervasiveness of political apathy at all levels 
of society that signaled to Western analysts the "crisis'' 
condition that the Soviet state was in (Lewin, 1989,123). 
In contrast to the lack of political engagement that 
Soviet society faced, it was beginning to experience the 
impact of slow social changes that had been developing 
for years. These changes included: increased 
urbanization, increased literacy, and increased 
communication technology. All of these changes had 
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important and far reaching effects on society and for 
the future of civil society. 
The process of urbanization in the Soviet Union had 
been occurring since the Bolshevik revolution. However, 
its long term impacts were just beginning to be felt in 
second and third generation urban dwellers in the late 
1970's. A top Soviet scholar, O.N. Ianitskii, has argued 
that one of the main impacts of urbanization has been 
the development of workers as individuals. This 
individualism was caused in part by the emphasis on 
personal life in cities and a high degree of autonomy 
within the urban family (Lewin, 1989, 64-66). Soviet 
society experienced the growth pains associated with the 
shift from a rural society to an urban one. One of the 
most important side-effects of this change was the 
inoculation of the ideas and the practices of individualism 
within the urban populace. 
The growing education level of the Soviet populace 
served to further emancipate society from the state. 
It created a society more critical of official propaganda 
and governmental policies. Consequently, increased 
education levels were accompanied by a loss of faith in 
the government's ability to manage political and societal 
matters (Starr 1989,29). The increasingly critical view 
that society took regarding official propaganda reduced 
the ideological pull that the state once had. Society 
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had gradually begun to see itself not as a homogeneous 
whole, as official ideology prescribed, but rather, as 
a heterogeneous mixture of multiple interests (Lapidus, 
1990, 141 ). This recognition of diversity was one of 
the critical elements which propelled individuals to join 
informal organizations that best represented their views. 
Soviet society was also besieged in the 1980's by 
the communications revolution that was occurring 
world-wide. The effect of this change was two fold: 
(1) There was substantially easier access to outside 
information as communication technology advanced. Western 
broadcasts, beamed across borders, such as the BBC, the 
Voice of America, and Radio Liberty, gained a substantial 
audience in the Soviet Union. Radio Liberty estimates 
for the late 1970's indicated that around 67.3 million 
adults, or about 37 percent of Soviet adults, listened 
to foreign broadcasts yearly (Benn,1992, 63). This 
increased information from foreign sources further 
discredited governmental propaganda in the eyes of an 
increasingly cynical Soviet society (Lewin, 1989,71); 
(2) The advancement of communications technology allowed 
for communication between individuals and groups that 
was difficult for the state to control. For example, 
tape recorders, never subject to official regulations, 
led to the dissemination of "dissident" music and speeches. 
So large was the influence of this device that by 1985, 
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Soviet surveys were showing that around 63 percent of 
adolescents were making musical recordings for themselves 
(Benn, 1992,35-36). Videotape recorders and personal 
computers, although more regulated than tape recorders, 
also opened other avenues for communication beyond state 
oversight. This enhanced communications ability allowed 
groups increasingly to network themselves, thus increasing 
their power and resources (Starr 1988, 33). These 
technical changes added mechanisms for society to 
communicate with itself without the interference of the 
state. 
The last change that affected Soviet society was 
its growing population. Although population growth is 
a normal phenomenon in societies, it has had particular 
consequences for the Soviet system. The Soviet state 
had attempted to control almost every aspect of the 
individual's life. However, with the increasing population 
this task became impossible. The level of control for 
which the state has striven is impossible in modern 
societies. Also, in the post-Stalinist period, the 
political will to use terror as a primary instrument for 
societial control greatly diminished. Consequently, due 
to the decreased fear of surveillance and regimentation, 
fear as a mechanism for societal control was not as strong 
as it once had been (Starr, 1988, 30). 
Gorbachev faced a society unlike any that his 
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predecessors had faced. While withdrawing from official 
matters and becoming increasingly apathetic at all levels 
about politics, society was fermenting in areas out of 
the state's control. Many of these long-term changes 
were being expressed in new realizations about society 
and the individual. These changes coupled with the impact 
of technological change produced a society that 
increasingly threatened to take the initiative out of 
the Party and put it into the hands of the people (Petro, 
1991, 128). Society was changing and beginning to feel 
the pressures of dragging the decaying Soviet state into 
the twenty-first century. This was the situation into 
which Gorbachev stepped and within which his reforms were 
conceived and tried. It is important to realize that 
he was not, as Frederick Starr noted, "creating change 
so much as uncorking it." (1988,27). 
What was Gorbachev's Position Towards the Core of 
the Civil Society Movement, the Informal Groups? 
Gorbachev's position toward informal groups evolved 
as the political atmosphere within which he was operating 
changed. Initially, Gorbachev and top Soviet leaders were 
extremely cautious about experimenting to bring about 
civil society. They were neither sure that civil society 
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was what they wanted, nor that it was the best mechanism 
to transform Soviet society (Tarasulo, 1992,6). 
Originally, Gorbachev's changes were aimed at simply 
starting the economic engine of the Soviet Union again. 
Glasnost, or openness, was to be used primarily as a 
mechanism to accelerate the economy by a process of 
"criticism and self-criticism" (Benn, 1992,12). However, 
it soon became obvious that this action would not be enough 
since society wanted real reform. Thus, as early as 1986, 
glasnost began to be seen in a broader sense, as a way 
to transform the political system of the Soviet Union. 
It was at this time that Gorbachev's perestroika, or 
restructuring, began to apply equally to aspects of social 
life. Perstroika than signified that deeper, even 
fundamental, changes would have to be made for the Soviet 
Union to reform. During the early phase of glasnost and 
perestroika, governmental policy was still focused on 
expanding officially organized groups (Kerblay, 1989,95). 
This policy was simply an extension of official policy 
as it had existed since the Stalinist era. Informal 
groups, in Russia, were tethered to the state by a 1932 
RFSFR law that permitted informal groups as long as they 
had a sponsoring governmental institution (Hosking, 
1990,64). The effect of the law was to allow informal 
organizations in name only. 
As the extent of glasnost and perestroika began to 
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expand in the late 1980's, Gorbachev took a more lenient 
view of informal organizations. This official 
permissiveness allowed informals to exist without being 
tethered to official organizations. However, Gorbachev 
still clearly did not want informal groups to threaten 
the Party and thus allowed reduced, but still persistent 
harassment of these groups (Hosking, 1990,7475). But, 
his meager embrace of the informal groups was to change 
at the historic 19th Party Congress, a change that will 
have ramifications for the political system in the former 
Soviet Union into the next century. 
Confronted with rising conservative opposition to 
his programs of reform, Gorbachev turned to the public 
to assist his cause. This political move is best seen 
in Gorbachev's explicit approval of the creation of 
informal organizations that would support his policy of 
perestroika. The effect of this endorsement from the top 
was the creation of a plethora of Marxist-Leninist 
discussion groups and popular fronts for the support of 
perestroika (Petro, 1991,104). Gorbachev, in a rare move 
for a Soviet leader, had turned to the public for help 
and they quickly had answered his call for support. He 
commented at the same party conference that the growth 
of informal organizations represented the growing diversity 
of Soviet society. Importantly, Gorbachev saw one of 
the utilities of informal organizations by realizing their 
76 
function as permanent mechanisms for "juxtaposing opinions, 
criticism and self-criticism'' (Hosking, 1990, 74). 
However, even with his explicit endorsement of informal 
groups, it is still likely that Gorbachev wanted to protect 
the primacy of the Party. 
Why did Gorbachev want informal organizations? The 
answer to this question has many different components 
(1) He needed societal support for his reforms to 
succeed; (2) There were economic reasons to favor the 
creation of informal organizations; (3) It was necessary 
to adapt to the changing Soviet society or risk losing 
the leading role of the Party once and for all; (4) Some 
of Gorbachev's top advisors favored moving in the direction 
of civil society; and (5) He had little idea of how to 
proceed with perestroika and hoped to use these 
organizations to generate new ideas and approaches. 
The analysis presented earlier in this paper indicated 
that Gorbachev inherited a society that was anything but 
content with its lot in life. The society was at first 
cynical about Gorbachev's new promised reforms, but was 
longing by 1988 for real change in the Soviet state 
(Sedaitis & Butterfield, 1991,3). Gorbachev's strategy 
was to drag the apolitical mass that society had become 
into action by allowing them to engage in differing types 
of voluntary associations (Bonnell,1991,155). Gorbachev's 
reliance on society for change was driven in large part 
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by the magnitude of the changes he was attempting. Without 
great social participation the state was not ready, let 
alone able, to solve any new tasks. Official documents 
argue that reaching out to the social sphere was seen 
as, "the key to the accelerated solution of numerous 
problems, current and future, of our life." (Lewin, 
1989,117) 
Another very real reason that Gorbachev turned to 
the public via voluntary association was, as already 
mentioned, to offset conservative opposition to his 
programs. Gorbachev saw these associations as a wellspring 
of support he could draw on in times of political need. 
These associations were to serve as a counter-weight to 
the official opposition to perestroika/glasnost among 
the conservative elements of Soviet government (Sedaitis 
& Butterfield, 1991, 10). Quite simply, for change from 
above to have any long-term chance for success, 
mobilization from below was necessary. The long-term 
support on which Gorbachev's policy changes hinged could 
only be achieved by a massive effort to mobilize society 
(Bonnell, 1991, 153). 
Another important consideration which motivated 
Gorbachev's support for informal associations was economic 
in origin. This support once again illustrates how the 
glasnost and perestroika reforms, although political in 
nature, were motivated by economic considerations. One 
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of the most important informal associations for Gorbachev's 
policy of economic restructuring was the cooperative. 
These organizations were given official status by the 
Law on Cooperatives of July, 1988. These informal 
associations quickly grew, to some 48,000 by January of 
1989, providing employment to almost a million Soviets 
(Bonnell, 1991, 152). The law was important in that it 
freed the new cooperative from the state; its charter 
did not have to be registered with the state, and most 
importantly it had the status of a legal entity (Slider, 
1991,146). This new status of the cooperative showed 
the extent of support Gorbachev gave to certain informal 
associations. Do to its importance to his economic plans, 
its rights were codified in Soviet law. This occurrence 
is rare among informal associations and signaled the 
importance he must have assigned to the cooperative. 
Another likely reason that Gorbachev endorsed informal 
association has to due with preserving the leading role 
of the state. If Gorbachev had not legitimized informals 
their growth would likely have posed a problem for the 
Party. The informal associations, such as discussion 
groups, grass roots envionmental movements, etc., even 
without official endorsement, were growing to the point 
of being formidable. The lack of official approval, 
coupled with the growing strength of the informal movement, 
could easily have led the associations to see the Party 
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as part of the problem and not the solution (Petro, 
1991,128). The likely outcome of this perception would 
have been to further alienate society from the state, 
at the exact moment that Gorbachev desperately needed 
its assistance. 
The influence of Gorbachev's top advisors in his 
decision to support explicitly informal associations should 
not be overlooked. A key Gorbachev advisor, Tatiana 
Zaslavskaya, began arguing in the early 1980's that 
interest group analysis presented the truest picture of 
Soviet society. According to her, the society was broken 
into different classes having interests that conflicted 
with each other. After Gorbachev was firmly entrenched 
in power, Zaslavskaya spelled out the implications of 
her analysis. She argued that people must understand 
their interests and that they must be expressed. However, 
verbalization of interests was not enough. According 
to Zaslavskaya, each interest must choose ''from its midst 
or find a spokesman for its interests, defenders of those 
interests.'' This analysis by Zaslavskaya provided a 
forceful philosophical justification for informal 
associations (Bonnell, 1991, 155). It is obvious from 
Gorbachev's words to the 19th Party Congress that 
Zaslavskaya's influence on him was great. For example, 
he acknowledged the diversity of Soviet society, clearly 
rejecting the propaganda of the Soviet homogeneous society 
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in favor of a more interest group oriented, heterogeneous 
view. 
Another top advisor, Aleksandr Yakovlev, is also 
likely to have influenced Gorbachev's positive, although 
late coming, support for informal association. In 1987, 
Yakovlev argued that the Soviet Union should adopt the 
common law stance that "everything not explicitly forbidden 
by law is permitted." The impact of this utterance was 
amazing, as Fredrick Starr noted: 
As if acting on the general secretary's advice, 
Soviet courts in the first half of 1987 sent back 
more cases for further investigation, handed down 
more acquittals, and threw out more suits than in 
any previous 6-month period in Soviet history. 
This action and the words of Yakovlev show a deep 
understanding of the rule of law and its civil society 
implications (Starr, 1988,37). Even if Yakovlev had no 
direct influence on Gorbachev's support for informal 
associations, the effect of his words on the Soviet 
judicial system certainly made the political atmosphere 
more conducive to the growth of informal associations. 
The impact of support for informals by Gorbachev 
has been far reaching and will be analyzed more in the 
next section. It is clear that Gorbachev to a very great 
extent wagered his future, and that of the Soviet state, 
on civil society and informal associations (Bonnell 
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91,158). At the very least, Gorbachev should be given 
credit for inspiring the informal associations for the 
support of perestroika which came into creation because 
of his call at the 19th Party Congress, and of overall 
making the Soviet political atmosphere more conducive 
to informal associations(Petro 1991,105). 
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Informal Associations, their composition and impact 
in Soviet society 
Informal associations in the Soviet Union and all 
of their components are called coloquially "neformaly" 
in Russian. The "neformaly" revolution was the heart 
of an attempt to move the Soviet Union closer to being 
a civil society. Put simply, without organizations 
existing outside of the control of the states, the 
neformaly, the achievement of civil society would be 
impossible. Soviet society by 1988 was increasingly 
attempting to define itself and the limits of the state's 
power through voluntary associations. The purpose of 
this section of the paper is to examine what informal 
groups are, the number of these groups that were in 
existence in the late 1980's, a breakdown of where they 
occurred, who their members were, what their political 
beliefs were, and their significance to society. 
Informal associations can be thought of as having 
three major components: (1) Individuals join to further 
common interests; (2) Membership is voluntary, not coerced 
by the state; (3) The groups exist outside of the 
boundaries of the state (Bonnell, 1991,151 ). Of all of 
their characteristics the last is the most important. 
These organizations do not officially participate in the 
political system, rather, their activities are conducted 
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outside of "official channels" (Sedaitis & Butterfield, 
1991, 1 ). However, simply because these groups exist 
outside of the state does not mean that they are 
necessarily opposed to it politically (Lewin, 1988,80). 
Informal associations, while greatly different among 
themselves, can be broken down in the late 1980's into 
three broad types: discussion groups, grievance 
committees, and political parties. The discussion groups 
met to discuss a wide variety of topics such as philosophy, 
politics, history and economics. People in these types 
of groups were simply attempting to orient themselves 
to the new and alien ideas that were facing them. The 
grievance committee category designates those groups which 
arose spontaneously to deal with problems which the 
government was unwilling or unable to solve. The specific 
problems with which the grievance committees were developed 
to deal varied from ecological issues, to preservation 
of historical monuments, to abuse of Party privilege. 
During Gorbachev's tenure these groups were despised by 
lower level party functionaries. However, this type of 
group had much protection from central party authorities 
due to its functional utility. The result was that the 
lower functionaries were forced grudgingly to accept their 
existence. However, when the central party authorities 
were not actively watching, these groups were often 
harassed at the local level. The last type of group are 
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those which could be called embryonic political parties. 
Individuals within these groups initially wanted to end 
the domination of the Communist Party. With a Central 
Committee decision in February of 1990 allowing for 
different political parties to exist, this category 
subsequently grew. The boundaries between these types 
of groups are not rigid. Rather, many groups that started 
out apolitical turned political after failing to achieve 
wanted change (Petro, 1991,105-106). It is important to 
note that truly "apolitical" informal associations could 
not exist since membership in these groups signaled a 
desire to step outside of the state which was in itself 
a political decision. 
The tremendous explosion of neformaly groups basically 
occurred overnight (Ra'anan, 1990,26). These groups 
bloomed like plants in the desert after a long overdue 
rain. The growth of these organizations increased the 
most in the late 1980's, according to available statistics 
(Petro, 1991,102). Pravda has documented the tremendous 
growth in these.organizations. According to Pravda, in 
1988 it was estimated that 30,000 groups existed. By 
1991, this estimate had been revised to a total of around 
60,000 groups. This estimate is likely to be low since 
not many unofficial groups feel compelled to register 
officially with the government (Hosking, 1991, 64). For 
example, in Moscow in 1991, of the over 2,000 known 
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informal associations, only 530 were officially registered 
with the state (Petro, 1991,102). There are a number 
of likely reasons that many groups did not register. 
First, the non-glasnost days were alive in the memories 
of all Soviets citizens. Thus, the compulsion against 
registering as a possible official opponent of the regime 
was still strong. The horror of the Stalinist era still 
caused fear in many and made them unwilling to register 
officially as possible "political dissidents". Second, 
little was to be gained from official registration. Since 
little legal codification of rights existed for most 
informal associations, the risk of registration outweighed 
meager benefits. Lastly, some analysts have argued, to 
remain truly independent and outside of the state it was 
necessary not to register. This action would then indicate 
a political decision among those non-registered groups 
to move away from the Soviet state (Brovkin, 1990,233). 
Due to their numbers and importance, one type of 
informal association, environmental groups, deserves 
special examination. Ecological matters, by 1989, had 
become substantially important to Soviet society. 
According to survey data from that year, 83.5% of Soviets 
polled were deeply concerned about the state of their 
environment (Ziegler, 1991,115). This great level of 
environmental concern in the late 1980's was spawned by 
the Chernobyl disaster and the Soviet government's bungled 
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efforts to deal with it (Maples, 1991,138). This deep 
concern about environmental issues led ecological informal 
associations to be among the most popular, and numerous, 
of all informal associations throughout the Soviet Union 
(Petro, 1991,108). Although the exact number of informal 
ecological groups was unknown, it was estimated that they 
numbered in the thousands (Frerer, 1991,336). It is next 
necessary to examine the nature and effects of these 
groups. 
Environmental groups were grass roots movements that 
had started from below and wished to remain outside of 
the control of the state (Altshuler & Mnatsakanyan, March 
1990, 29). Due to this characteristic, and the nature 
of practices within the groups, they were of a 
fundamentally democratic nature. Most of the groups, 
outside of the Russian Republic, often tied environmental 
concerns together with nationalist demands (Ziegler, 
1991,129,114). This occurrence was natural since to many 
non-Russian nationalities the exploitation of their 
environment was indicative of a larger problem of political 
exploitiation of their Republic by the Soviet state. 
Accordingly, in many of the non-Russian Republics, the 
environmenal groups were very political in nature. In 
some Republics, notably Ukraine, these environmental groups 
later grew into Green political parties (Maples, 1991, 
141- 142). 
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The impact of these environmental groups has been 
wide ranging. On a practical level, most groups were 
very successful in influencing decisions that affected 
their environment. For example, one Russsian environmental 
group, the Lake Baikal Protection Society, brought pressure 
to bear on the local government and stopped plans to divert 
pollution from a paper mill into the Irkutsk river. This 
group, by 1990, had enough support to motivate the national 
government, through the Central Committee and Council 
of Ministers, to mandate cleanup of the Lake Baikal area 
by 1995 (Ziegler, 1991,122-123). 
The environmental groups had an uninteneded 
consequence as many of them led to the formation of 
political parties. For example, in the Ukraine and Russia, 
Green Parties were created to provide an umbrella 
organization for ecologically concerned politically active 
environmental groups (Ziegler, 1991, 142 & Frerer, 
1991,336). The Greens also figured importantly in the 
political makeup of the Congress of Peoples Deputies, 
where it was estimated that around 15 percent of all the 
deputies were Greens or interested in environmental issues 
(Altshuler & Mnatsakanyan, March 1990,9). So important 
were the Greens in 1990, that the American Committee on 
US-Soviet Relations noted, "Green activism is in the 
vanguard of democratization throughout the USSR." (Frerer, 
1991,336) 
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Overall, those groups which were environmental and 
nationalist in their orientation were the most successful 
in inluencing policy, due to their larger base of support 
(Sediatis & Butterfield, 1991,7). However, it was exactly 
these groups, in the non-Russian Republics, which caused 
more difficulty by increasing nationalist separatist 
demands. These environmental nationalist groups added 
another reason for the conservatives in the Party to fear 
and want to suppress informal associations: they threatened 
the existence of the Union. 
The Russian Republic was not the center for the growth 
of all informal associations. The greatest growth of 
these groups did not occur in the center, but rather, 
in the non-Russian periphery of the Republics (Bonnell, 
1991,155). However, my analysis will focus in this section 
on informal association within the Russian Republic for 
two main reasons. First, these are the associations that 
many believed would be the decisive ones in influencing 
the battle between conservatives and reformers within 
the Soviet state (Brovkin, 1990,233). Second, more 
systematic data is available on these informal associations 
than for any of the other Republics. 
Within the RSFSR, the largest concentrations of 
informal associations, not surprisingly, were found in 
the large cities, especially Moscow and Leningrad. The 
fact that these groups existed primarily in cities has 
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made some see them as "islands" within the vast and barren 
political sea of the Republic (Brovkin, 1990,238). 
Most participants in informal organizations were 
very young. It is estimated, with the use of survey data, 
that between 50 and 70 percent of youths participated 
in informal associations. However, in certain cities this 
number may have run higher. For example, in 1987 in Moscow, 
90 percent of the members of informal associations were 
under twenty-five years of age (Bonnell, 1991,156). Survey 
data from 1988 indicated that 50 percent of youths 
participated irregularly in informal associations, with 
only between 10 and 13 percent actively participating. 
This would roughly work out to between 1.8 and 2.4 million 
youths. It is not surprising with this large youth 
contingent in informal associations that it was expected 
that the official youth organization Komsomol membership 
would decline by at least 50 percent by 2000 (Petro, 
1991,103+124). 
A further breakdown on the basis of age can be seen 
by examining the types of groups certain age groups 
dominated. Individuals in their late twenties and early 
thirties were drawn to high profile groups that worked 
for social justice. These social justice groups were 
one of the largest components of informal associations 
in the RSFSR (Petro, 91,103). Most of the individuals 
who joined these social justice groups could be considered 
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cultural intelligentsia. This fact indicates what the 
dominant concerns of the intellgentsia were. However, 
one has to be careful about calling all involved 
individuals members in these groups. For the most part, 
members were limited to a small core and the rest could 
more correctly be called supporters of the particular 
association (Brovkin, 1990,245). 
The membership and beliefs of informal associations 
were so very diverse that the only thing that many had 
in common was that they stood outside of the same 
traditional political structure (Brovkin, 1990,233). 
The politics of these groups also greatly varied, ranging 
from the conservative nationalism of Pamyat to the 
ultra-liberal tendencies of the Democratic Union. However, 
it was possible in 1989 to arrange most groups within 
four broad categories: those who supported change within 
the existing structure, those who rejected the existing 
structure and called for multi-party systems, popular 
fronts for Perestroika which originally existed simply 
to support Gorbachev's policies and became broad based 
umbrella organizations, and lastly nationalist political 
groups which viewed all politics through the lens of their 
particular ethnic heritage (Petro, 1991,111-112). 
Generally, most informal associations in the RSFSR were 
liberal and desired substantial change within the Soviet 
state (Brovkin, 1990,238). 
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The significance of the growth of these informal 
organizations cannot be overstated. They were the 
incarnation of individualism in a society which has faced 
the domination of what was often the epitome of the statist 
system, the Soviet totalitarian state. The impact that 
these groups have had and their significance is the next 
area of analysis within the paper. This analysis will 
focus on how these groups signaled a significant shift 
in the Soviet political system. The introduction and 
legitimation of informal associations has ensured that 
post-Soviet politics will never again be what it once 
was. 
The most important effect of the growth of informal 
associations was the decline in the leading·role of the 
Communist state. The proliferation of informal 
associations, individuals acting outside of the control 
of the state, was a strong sign that the post-Stalinist 
structure was in a precipitous decline. The growth of 
informal organizations has shown that the perseverance 
of the individual for his/her freedom can outlast the 
coercive power of the state. 
Increasingly, in the Soviet Union in the late days 
of Gorbachev, the Party was losing the initiative to 
society (Staar, 1991,128). Public opinion was no longer 
something rarely to be paid attention. Rather, the public 
was increasingly not only defining policymaking options 
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but also framing the entire scope of political discussions 
(Sedaitis & Butterfield, 1991, 1). Society was assuming 
this new role because "interests" were beginning vocally 
and persistently to make their demands known. This 
occurrence led to what Gorbachev had wanted in part, 
different views on how reform should be carried out. 
The tremendous impact of society influencing policy, as 
opposed to it being the passive recipient of directions 
from the state, can not be overstated. 
The newly assertive role of society was problematic 
for Gorbachev because it meant the end of the leading 
role of the Party, to the reform of which he had committed 
himself. Turning to society for assistance against 
conservative opposition, Gorbachev was playing a very 
dangerous game. The French social philosopher Castoriadis 
has argued that Gorbachev's delusion was to believe that 
he could order people into activity and still restrain 
their wants and dreams with vague limits that constantly 
changed (Tismaneanu, 1990,S). The declining role of the 
Party however, was not entirely beneficial for the growth 
of civil society. As will be examined later, the fact 
that society challenged outright the supremacy of the 
state was potentially an obstacle to the further 
advancement of civil society. Quite simply, in the later 
1980's the Communist Party was not entirely down and out 
and its potential for coercive behavior was truly worrisome 
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to supporters of reform. 
Informal associations, for the most part, did not 
attempt formally to take on the central government. 
Rather, the strategy of the informal political 
organizations was to "take on city hall." This strategy 
led to a shift on politics from the national to the local 
level where informal associations had more pull (Petro, 
1991,124). The groups at the local level, for the most 
part in the late 1980's, were not yet full fledged 
political parties. Rather, they began to act as "interest 
groups" advocating certain local policy options, as 
Zaslavskaya had foreseen (Ra'anan, 1990,27). At the local 
level, informal organizations won significant political 
battles against an entrenched Communist state over specific 
problems ranging from the protection of historical-cultural 
monuments targeted for destruction, to the stopping of 
specific programs that would harm local environments. 
The most important effect of this "localization" of 
politics within the Soviet Union was that it further 
entrenched the idea of civil society in society. Simple 
discussion groups evolved into action groups that def ended 
individual interests against the state. 
Some of the more openly political informal 
associations were beginning to play the role of real 
"political opposition" by 1988 within the Soviet system. 
Two examples bear this out: the Moscow Tribune, and the 
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Alliance of the Federation of Socialist Clubs (FSOK) with 
Popular Fronts. The Moscow Tribune was a club made up 
of about 100 members and was founded in October of 1988. 
The group included the leading intelligentsia for radical 
reform of society. Members included R.Z. Sagdeev, Roy 
Medvedev and Tatiana Zaslavskaya. The fact that prominent 
members of this "loyal opposition" were elected to the 
Congress of People's Deputies moved them into the stage 
of formal politics (Brovkin, 1990,240). Members of this 
group, after their election to the Congress, began to 
use their informal association to influence actions within 
the Congress. The name of the association was changed 
from the "Moscow Tribune" to the "Interregional Group". 
The organization then adopted a platform of political 
action that included universal suffrage elections for 
the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, guarantees for the 
sovereignty of the republics, demonopolization of the 
state's control of the economy, protection for individual 
rights in accordance with international human rights 
agreements that the USSR had signed, and the right of 
People's deputies to form parliamentary groups. It should 
be obvious that this group was no longer simply an informal 
association. TASS, the official newspaper of the party, 
noted the group had become the "Soviet opposition" 
(Ra'Anan, 1990,29,34,36). 
The FSOK and Popular Front alliance shows another 
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interesting example of informal associations becoming 
political actors. These organizations in the summer of 
1988 attempted to mobilize the public for Gorbachev against 
conservative opposition. This function, mobilizing support 
for the leader, is very similar to functions carried out 
by parliamentary parties. If Gorbachev is thought of 
as leader of an opposition group in a parliament, the 
actions of FSOK and the Popular Fronts were very similar 
to those carried out by the official opposition in those 
systems (Hosking, 1990,70-71). Regardless, the fact that 
these unofficial groups were trying to solicit support 
for Gorbachev is another sign of the extent of political 
change occurring in the late 1980's. 
Another of the greatest signs of the degree of 
political change in the Soviet Union in the late 1980's 
involved the ability of informal associations to influence 
the election of candidates to the Congress of People's 
Deputies. Proposals had existed, during the electoral 
process to allow informal associations to nominate 
candidates for office. This move was seen by many 
communists as threatening the nomenklatura system that 
had been firmly in place since Brezhnev (Lapidus, 
1991,142). Many party functionaries stepped up their 
harassment campaigns against the informals. Far from 
intimidating the informals, it simply heightened their 
resolve. In the end, after significant interference with 
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informal associations from officials, they were still 
able heavily to influence the elections. The election 
results were a significant victory for the informals; 
they defeated 35 obkom secretaries and 200 other high 
ranking communists. These election victories and the 
attempt of the informals to influence election results 
were of monumental importance. This occurrence showed 
that Soviet society was through being apolitical. Society 
had once again become a political beast. In the minds 
of many top analysts and as subsequent events have born 
out, these new more politically mature informal 
associations were themselves embryos of future political 
parties (Brovkin, 1990, 254). 
The best example of how informal associations became 
interest groups can be seen in the cooperatives. Even 
after being legally allowed to exist by the 1988 law, 
cooperatives still faced opposition from communist agencies 
which oversaw their activities. During the course of 
1988 and 1989 it became increasingly obvious that 
cooperatives were still facing harassment by certain 
governmental agencies. Individual cooperatives began 
to band together to face the powerful governmental 
interests threatening their very existence. They formed 
in 1989 a national organization for all cooperatives called 
the "National Union of Associated Cooperatives." This 
organization began to attempt to influence national 
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policy-makers in meetings with them. More importantly, 
the union used its large financial resources to organize 
and finance friendly political parties for election to 
the Congress of People's Deputies. For example, in 
Belorussia a cooperative that made environmental monitoring 
devices began to make financial contributions to the "green 
movement" in the Republic (Slider, 1991,145-155). The 
development of the Union and its actions followed almost 
to the letter the pattern that Zaslavskaya had foreseen 
for Soviet society. The cooperatives had consciously sought 
to defend their interests by uniting and influencing 
political decisions that affected them; in Western theory 
they had become a special interest group~ 
Again, I will emphasize that the importance of the 
informal associations can not be overstated. These groups, 
with their relatively young composition, have influenced, 
and are likely to continue influencing politics in the 
former Soviet Union for the foreseeable future. They 
have played an integral role in moving the Soviet Union 
from being a stagnant monolithic state to being a dynamic 
political system with official opposition, interest groups, 
and most importantly individual political choices. It 
is quite possible that Trotsky's words to the Mensheviks 
are resounding in the ears of former Soviet Communists. 
Trotsky spoke these words, ironically a fitting epitaph 
for the now dead Communist Party, "Your role is played 
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IMPEDIMENTS TO THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE SOVIET UNION 
The future of civil society in the Soviet Union, 
while brighter under Gorbachev than at any time since 
the Bolshevik revolution, was still not certain. Civil 
society, much like Rome, could not be built in a day. 
Even today, after the fall of the Communist Party and 
the dissolution of the Soviet state, a full fledged civil 
society does not exist in the former u.s.s.R. There have 
been a number of formidable barriers that civil society 
has had to overcome to implant itself in Soviet soil: 
conservative opposition, historical barriers, nationalist 
demands, and the fragmentation of society. 
Although Gorbachev eventually endorsed the idea of 
informal organizations at the 19th Party Congress, it 
must be remembered that his support was late coming and 
tepid at best. Many leaders, before and after Gorbachev's 
endorsement, still had grave reservations about allowing 
civil society's informal associations to grow. Opponents 
of informal associations argued that these groups were 
"extremist" and were out to destroy the Communist Party 
(Hosking, 1990,74). The opponents of informal associations 
reached into the highest level of government where it 
is known that Igor Ligachev, a top Politburo member, 
desired to crush their growth (Petro, 1991,125). 
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Initially, the motivating factor propelling 
conservative opposition to informal associations was that 
they threatened the monopoly on power the Communist Party 
had. As many top Western analysts have pointed out, civil 
society cannot exist in a one party state. Thus, for 
the Soviet society to move towards civil society multiple 
parties would have had to be created, which would have 
cut at the heart of the party's power (Starr, 1989,308) 
(Petro, 1991,125). Analysis of the historic growth of 
civil society in former Communist states indicates its 
rise is accompanied by a subsequent decrease in the power 
of the party-state (Kuzenstov, 1990,183). 
The Party in the new environment of glasnost and 
perestroika was unsure at first about how to react to 
informal associations. The response, while inconsistent, 
generally included harassment such as fines, imprisonment 
and confiscation of materials. The inconsistent response 
by the government led to confusion about what was 
permissible. The first definitive action the state took 
was in the summer of 1988 when it passed a law regarding 
the rules of conduct for demonstrations and created a 
special " police" riot squad to deal with the informal 
associations. In August, this new "police" squad took 
it first action by crushing a demonstration to commemorate 
the 20th anniversary of the occupation of Czechoslovakia 
by Soviet forces. This action in August signaled an end 
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to the experimental permissiveness of the state. However, 
worse times were still to come. 
The informal associations had always been considered 
a serious threat by conservatives. So serious was the 
threat, according to a samizdat publication, that plans 
had been established to disconnect some 90 percent of 
private phones in Moscow if an "emergency" arose. But, 
the state began to see informal associations as even more 
of a threat after their success in influencing the 
elections to the Congress of People's Deputies. 
The informal associations had become involved in 
the elections due to the harassment they had faced in 
the Republic. During the elections, this harassment was 
further intensified. This did not stop the informal 
associations from scoring electoral success as has already 
been discussed. The state did not wish to acknowledge 
that they had failed at the task of governing and that 
the people wanted to replace them. Rather, the state 
argued that the electoral failure of many socialist 
candidates was not the party's fault but the fault of 
the informals. It was in this mood that the Communist 
Party decided it would not give up power voluntarily. 
The Party in almost all Republics carried out some form 
of retribution against the informals ranging from warnings 
in Leningrad to shootings in Georgia. Indeed, on the 
eve of the new Congress of People's Deputies first meeting, 
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there were rumors that certain Communist Party 
organizations had started forming their own private 
militias (Brovkin, 1990,237-252). 
In late 1989, the civil society reformers faced a 
great opponent, the Communist Party of the u.s.s.R. The 
Party was not willing easily to relinquish its grasp on 
power. Instead, the Party was determined to fight every 
inch of the growth of civil society. This barrier was 
very formidable because of the great resources and coercive 
pressure the Party could bring to bear against informals. 
However, with the dissolution of the Party after the August 
1991 coup, this barrier was diminished because conservative 
opponents of reform could no longer bring the full coercive 
power of the state to bear against the informal 
associations. 
One of the most formidable barriers to the 
establishment of civil society in the Soviet Union has 
been the historical legacy of the nation. Previous 
attempts at civil society and informal associations, for 
example in pre-Soviet Russia, were very fragile and in 
the end overwhelmed by the environment in which they 
existed. The one period that serves as the largest 
historical obstacle for civil society is the Stalinist 
period. During this time, civil society and informal 
associations were overwhelmed by the concentrated power 
of the state. As has already been discussed, Stalinism 
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greatly scarred Soviet society. Due to the nature of 
repression during this period, society was atomized and 
individuals were ingrained with a suspicion of one another. 
This fragmentation created a wound within society that 
still has not yet completely healed. Overall, the 
Russian/Soviet experience has yieleded few victories for 
civil society advocates. In almost every historical epoch 
when democratization has occurred it has in the end been 
crushed by the state. These many losses for democratic 
reformers have created an underlying attitude of "why 
try?" which dissidents, and later informal associations, 
have had to overcome. However, this obstacle may be one 
that has faded in the light of the new realities in the 
former Soviet Union. 
The nationalities question constituted another 
important barrier to the growth of civil society in the 
Soviet Union As Soviet society began to act on its 
realization that it was not homogeneous, certain 
nationalistic elements wished to be released from the 
Soviet state (Ra'anan 1990,83-84). The Soviet Union had 
always been acutely aware of its nationalities problem 
since the beginning days of the federation of socialist 
states. However, due to the power of the Party and 
intolerance for dissent, nationalist movements had been 
forced deeply underground after they had arisen 
sporadically. As the Party became more lenient, because 
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of political decisions under Gorbachev and the "official" 
toleration of informal associations, nationalist movements 
came out from hiding, and quickly grew into separatist 
political parties. This occurrence had two important 
effects on civil society's growth. First, as these 
separatist movements grew the Party felt increasingly 
threatened as it seemed the Union was about to disintegrate 
in its hands. This threat to the Union made the Party 
more reactive as a whole to informal associations. The 
first impact was to deepen the conservative opposition 
to civil society ( Ra'anan, 1990,83-84). Second, informal 
associations in the non-Russian Republics took on a life 
of their own. These organizations, overall, were no longer 
interested with the Soviet Union. Instead, they wanted 
to begin restoring their national independence and ethnic 
heritage. Within the Russian Republic, one of the 
reactions to this occurence, was a great resurgence of 
Russian nationalism. But, even this backlash in the 
Russian Republic, was not enough to stop the informal 
associations in the non-Russian Republics from forcing 
the transition to non-Soviet rule. 
The last barrier to the growth of civil society in 
the Soviet Union is one that still endures today in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States,. It is that not all 
members of society care about it becoming "civil." As 
the earlier analysis on informal associations indicates 
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they are made up of mainly young urbanites who are members 
of the cultural intellgentsia. This fact is important 
because it means the base from which civil society could 
find support, while not a static condition, was originally 
limited. Also, certain sections of Russian society, are 
still conservative and anti-democratic. These sections 
long for the "stability" of the past and consequently 
do not want any further change. Since all of society 
has not been receptive to the message of civil society, 
potential anti-civil society elements exist even in the 
post-Communist Commonwealth. 
This analysis of impediments to the growth of civil 
society in the Soviet Union has not been exhaustive. 
Rather, an attempt has been made to highlight the major 
obstacles that informal associations faced in late 1989. 
The most important of these obstacles was the continued 
opposition to civil society of the Communist Party. 
Although Gorbachev had endorsed informal associations, 
official harassment of these groups still continued. 
However, importantly, it was not at a level that made 
the growth or participation in these groups impossible. 
The nationalities problem still posed difficulty for the 
growth of civil society in the former Soviet Union. 
Although the Republics had gained their independence from 
the center, many ethnic minorities were still contained 
within individual Republics. As informal associations 
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grew in these ethnic minorities, increased pressure was 
put on the individual Republics to recognize and respect 
the autonomy of these groups. Even if these demands were 
not of a separatist nature, as some were, they put more 
demands on the already meager resources many Republics 
had. Conservative opposition, while no longer at the 
helm of the state, found new allies within the Russian 
nationalist movment. This alliance of 
conservatives/nationalists is likely, due to those groups' 
hostility to informal assocations, to continue to pose 
a substantial threat, not only to informal associations 
but democratic reforms in general. Last, the urban/rural 
fragmentation of society will continue to deprive reformers 
of the full support of all society. The impact of this 
can not yet be analyzed, since for all practical purposes, 





Soviet society, during the years of Gorbachev, 
underwent tremendous change. The question which remains 
is whether the civil society model helps to explain this 
change. To answer this question it is necessary to 
re-examine the questions posed in the first chapter of 
this thesis and analyze how well the model answers them. 
To what extent does the civil society concept help to 
explain the nature of the change that occurred in Soviet 
society? To what degree does the civil society concept 
have indigenous roots in the Russian/Soviet experience? 
What, if any, predictive validity can this model be said 
to have? 
There is no doubt that the changes that occurred 
under Gorbachev were of a fundamental nature. The question 
the model must help to answer, to show its utility, is 
how important these changes were. The civil society 
concept, as has been already discussed, focuses on society 
existing independently of the state. The society finds 
cohesion within itself by forming informal associations 
where individuals of like minds freely gather to discuss 
ideas. These groups may make demands on the states around 
specific issues and when functioning in this role 
approximate interest groups. These groups are allowed 
to exist and are protected from the state by the rule 
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of law. 
The model stresses that one of the importanct aspects 
of these informal associations is that they limit the 
power of the state over the individual (de Tocqueville, 
1945,118). Certainly, in the Soviet experience this 
attribute of informal associations cannot be overlooked. 
The analysis in the preceding chapters has shown how the 
formation of informal associations has been in response 
to social atomism forced on society by the state. The 
analysis in the thesis has also shown how the informal 
associations, through, for example, the dissident movement, 
have broken the monopoly on ideas that the state exercised 
about the future of society. The analysis also suggests 
in the Gorbachev period that society was indeed effectively 
limiting the power of the state. The greatest example 
of this limitation occurred during the victory of informal 
association supported candidates over Communist Party 
candidates in the Congress of People's Deputies elections 
in 1989. In this instance, society was reclaiming control 
over political matters from the state. 
The model does have one difficulty with explaining 
this importance of informal associations. Why, if informal 
associations protect individuals from the power of the 
state, was the state repeatedly able to crush these 
associations? The answer to this question has a number 
of different dimensions. First, and most importantly, 
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civil society, before Gorbachev, was never allowed fully 
to grow. The analysis of the historical development of 
civil society in the Soviet Union has indicated that at 
times, previous to Gorbachev, civil society was at best 
embryonic. This immature civil society was simply not 
able to withstand the power of either the Russian 
autocratic, or the Soviet state. Second, the model's 
assertion that civil society protects individuals from 
encroachment from the state is not meant to suggest that 
it completely limits the state's power. Rather, informal 
associations present a limited sphere of freedom in which 
individuals operate in that it is free from state control. 
Certainly, the informal associations of late Imperial 
Russia, the dissident movement, and informal groups under 
Gorbachev accomplished this goal. Although not complete, 
informal associations did, simply by their nature, limit 
the power of the state. Third, and last, it is impossible, 
due to the historic immaturity of civil society in the 
Soviet Union, to tell the extent to which these informal 
groups may limit the power of the state. Since civil 
society is just currently beginning to move beyond its 
embryonic stage in the Soviet Union, this judgment must 
be reserved for later researchers. 
The civil society model, as used in this thesis, 
also contains elements of interest group articulation. 
The importance of this behavior was explained in the last 
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chapter in reference to Tatyana Zaslavskaya. Zaslavskaya 
and Skilling believe that society has realized its 
heterogeneous nature and that individuals have begun to 
look for specific groups that share their values. These 
groups have then articulated their demands on the state. 
The thesis is full of examples of informal associations 
asserting their specific interests to the state; they 
range in focus from the dissident movement to environmental 
groups. This articulation of interests is seen as 
important by the model because it is a new mechanism for 
society to communicate with the state. No longer must 
individuals stand isolated against the power of the 
government. Informal associations allow individuals to 
unite and compete with the state in the political arena 
for power. It should be noted that not all informal 
associations attempt this interest articulation. As the 
thesis has noted, many informal associations are simply 
discussion clubs. However, the trend, even in these these 
clubs has been towards a more active political role. 
The model also notes the importance of informal 
associations in forming political associations. Alexis 
de Tocqueville, in Democracy in America, explained the 
nature of this relationship: 
Civil associations pave the way for political ones, 
but on the other hand the art of political 
associations develops and improves this technique 
for civil purpose. (1945,123) 
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This connection between informal associations and political 
associations is clearly supported in this thesis. To 
begin with, under Soviet rule any informal association, 
since it existed outside of the state was a "political" 
association. Individuals, simply by associating freely 
were challenging the power of the Soviet state and 
consequently taking political action. Also, some informal 
associations have gone on to become true political 
associations, or opposition parties, under Gorbachev. 
The best example of this would be Moscow Tribune that, 
once elected to the Congress of People's Deputies, formed 
the Interregional Group and began to articulate political 
demands. Even the state has recognized the transformation 
of the Moscow Tribune into a political opposition as was 
noted by TASS's reference to them as "Soviet opposition" 
(Ra'Anan, 1990,36). 
Overall, the model provides a good understanding 
of the nature of societal change occurring under Gorbachev. 
The model highlights certain types of activity, for 
example, the formation of informal associations, and helps 
to explain both its practical and theoretical importance. 
However, alone, this model does not explain the 
significance of these events in the Soviet state. This 
understanding can only be gained by analyzing the 
historical growth of civil society in the Soviet Union. 
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Because the model was not specifically developed to explain 
societal change in the Soviet Union it minimizes the 
fundamental, system changing nature of these actions. 
However, this insight can be gained by examining, as the 
thesis did, the historical growth, and roots of civil 
society in the Soviet Union. 
The next question to be analyzed is to what extent 
the civil society model has indigenous roots in the 
Russian/Soviet experience. To answer this question, the 
thesis examined the historical origins, and evolution, 
of civil society beliefs and informal associations in 
late Imperial Russia, and the Soviet era. Put simply, 
the concept has limited, but important, roots in the 
Russian/Soviet experience. The thesis has shown that 
the greatest growth of civil society occurred in Russia 
during the last years of the Czar. This civil society 
never completely materialized; at best, it was "embryonic." 
The reasons for this lack of the growth of civil society 
were several: the historic lack of a middle class, the 
autocratic nature of the state, lack of agricultural 
surplus. The fragile civil society that was established 
was overwhelmed by the First World War, the Soviet 
revolution, and the Bolshevik consolidation of power. 
The only brief reprieve for society during this time was 
the NEP period. However, the analysis presented in this 
thesis has shown that this period did not present a rebirth 
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of civil society or even of informal associations. Society 
was subjected after the NEP to Stalin's rule which aimed 
at atomizing society and establishing state control over 
the individual. The state accomplished these goals through 
a variety of different draconian measures and consequently 
made sure no civil society would occur. However, 
interestingly, during this period, although civil society 
and informal associations did not exist, it is clear that 
the state was battling to defeat the concept's values, 
such as freedom of association and the right to exist 
independent of the state. From Krushchev through Andropov, 
Soviet leaders fought a battle against the dissent 
movement. This movement advocated and fought for civil 
society values. In the end, the state through coercive 
measures was able to overcome the informal associations 
that comprised this movement. But, although finally 
defeated, this period and movement are important because 
it was the first time since the death of Stalin that 
society spoke and acted independently of the state. 
Under Gorbachev, the nature of the relationship 
between society and state underwent a fundamental 
transformation. The state increasingly allowed society 
to act independently, often simply because it could not 
prevent it from doing so. The question is, does the civil 
society model have any role historically in explaining 
this change? The answer to this question must be a 
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tentative yes. First, the civil society concept is not 
foreign to the Soviet Union. As the analysis in this 
thesis has shown, during important, although short-lived 
periods of reform in Russia/Soviet Union, civil society 
has been the ideal system reformers have been moving 
towards. This call has been the most explicit under 
Gorbachev when reformers have used "civil society" as 
a rallying call. Second, the Soviet state has historically 
stuggled to prevent the creation of civil society. Since 
the days of Lenin, the state has attempted to eliminate 
private property, and associations of individuals outside 
of the control of the state, and to limit the use of the 
rule of law. This struggle against the civil society 
values was waged with greatest intensity under Stalin, 
but remained an underlying current in all periods of Soviet 
rule. This unifying theme among Soviet leaders illustrates 
the importance of the model as embodying an alternative 
set of values which the state has historically struggled 
against. 
Although this thesis has demonstrated that civil 
society is not a foreign concept to the Soviet Union it 
has also shown the hostility that exists towards the 
concept. Society, as a whole, has not overwhelmingly 
accepted the message of civil society. Instead, 
historically, only certain segments of society, the 
middling groups in Imperial Russia and the intelligentsia 
11 5 
in the Soviet period, have supported civil society values. 
This fragmentation of support for civil society values 
was analyzed in detail when considering impediments to 
the growth of civil society in the last chapter. This 
fragmented support for civil society, coupled with its 
many losses against the Soviet state, points to the fact 
that this concept, while not foreign to Soviet society, 
has not been historically welcomed. This condition leads 
to the conclusion that while the model has roots in the 
Russian experience it does not have acceptance by most 
of society. However, among the individuals pushing for 
social change, the concept has been vital. 
The analysis of the origins and historical development 
of civil society and informal associations in the Soviet 
Union served to show the drastic new direction the Soviet 
state was taking under Gorbachev. The Russian/Soviet 
states have been historically hostile to society, and 
certainly to its independent operation in areas outside 
of the state's control. Under Gorbachev, the historical 
hostility at first was minimized, and then completely 
disappeared. The reforms taken by society were of a 
fundamentally democratic nature. The thesis has also 
attempted to show the revolutionary importance of these 
democratic changes, for under Gorbachev, the Soviet/Russian 
people moved closer to democracy than ever before in their 
nation's history. 
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The last question to be analyzed concerns the 
predictive validity of the civil society model. In other 
words, how well does the model predict what the actions 
and motivations for societal change are? This question 
is currently largely unanswerable. To begin with, it 
is impossible to know how civil society will develop, 
if at all, in the Soviet Union. Currently, civil society 
once again in the former Soviet Union has achieved some 
sort of embryonic existence. However, without a crystal 
ball it is impossible to tell how this system will develop. 
In other words, it is currently difficult to analyze how 
well the civil society model will predict the development 
of civil society in the Soviet Union since the process 
has just begun. Second, the model is not built to be 
predictive in a hostile environment. The civil society 
model, and its founders, do not discuss what occurs to 
civil society and informal associations if the state is 
hostile to their growth. These models, due to their 
Western European creation, assume the state will tolerate 
their growth. However, this toleration of societal 
independence has not occurred in the Soviet Union. Today, 
there are still strong groups within the former Soviet 
Union which call for a return to some sort of statist 
system either a new autocracy, or a resumption of Communist 
rule. The model was not designed to assume these 
conditions and thus reveals little insight into what will 
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occur. 
Further research must be done to ascertain the 
predictive validity of the civil society model in the 
Soviet Union. This research is of great importance because 
it will illustrate the extent to which the model is useful. 
In other words, if civil society collapses in the Soviet 
Union and some sort of authoritarian state is reinstated, 
the civil society concept may only help to explain the 
nature of change under Gorbachev. In this case, the model 
would primarily be an analytic model for examining an 
anomaly in Soviet history. Further research is necessary 
to modify the civil society concept to application in 
non-Western environments. In this regard, analysis of 
the ongoing battle between society and state in the former 
Soviet Union may be useful. It is quite likely that an 
analysis of these events could shed light on how civil 
society operates in a hostile environment. 
The analysis presented in this thesis indicates that 
the civil society concept can help to explain the nature 
of societal change that occurred under Gorbachev. The 
concept is important because it emphasizes the fundamental 
importance of these changes in moving the Soviet Union 
towards an alternative path of development. The model, 
combined with a historicalal overview of the growth of 
informal associations in the USSR, helps in understanding 
the monumental importance of this democratic alternative. 
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However, the model's predictive validity is largely 
unknown. This deficiency is due in part to the fact that 
a full civil society has yet to develop in the Soviet 
Union. Another major concern with the predicitive ability 
of this model is that it was not developed to explain 
how civil society would react to a hostile state. Due 
to this fact, this model suffers from a slight Western 
bias by assuming that civil society will be allowed to 
grow freely. This has not historically been the case 
in the Russian/Soviet experience. Further research is 
thus necessary to fine tune the model more for specific 
application to the Soviet Union. In the final analysis, 
this model is a novel idea which helps to explain the 
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